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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND THE SEPARATED POWERS
OF MORAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Joseph P. Fishman*
This Article examines the copyright industries' "moral entrepreneurs," sociolo-
gist Howard Becker's term for enterprising crusaders who seek to change existing
social norms regarding particular conduct. Becker's conception of moral entrepre-
neurship consists of two groups performing separate tasks: rule creators work to
translate their preferred norms into legal prohibitions, and then a separate class of
enforcers administer those prohibitions. In a limited sense, U.S. copyright law
hews to this scheme. Legislation such as the No Electronic Theft Act of 1997 and
the Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005 has assigned the federal
government an increasing role in defining intellectual-property deviance. At the
same time, however, the Copyright Act's civil enforcement scheme elides this
separation of powers by allowing the rule creators to serve as their own enforcers.
Between its criminal and civil remedial schemes, the Copyright Act allows two
different paradigms of moral entrepreneurship to operate in parallel: one assigns
enforcement to the state while the other entrusts it to the original rule creators. As
a result, both rule creators and prosecutors can use infringement litigation to try to
map copyright's moral boundaries.
A side-by-side comparison of these two enforcement paradigms shows that the
Department of Justice has proven more effective at instilling a norm against
copyright infringement than the rightsholders whose interests it represents. By
selectively focusing on unsympathetic defendants, prosecutors are defining devi-
ance while avoiding the backlash that has greeted civil plaintiffs. This story offers
a lesson, corroborated by other historical examples, concerning what I call the
separated powers of moral entrepreneurship. Because professional enforcers tend
to lack the moral fervor of the rule creators, they may decline to enforce the rule in
situations where the rule creator, if given the opportunity, would forge ahead. This
quality makes professional enforcers better equipped to avoid backlash when
particular enforcement activities are out of step with widely held social norms. A
rule creator who enforces her own rule risks cannibalizing the favorable norms
upon which she had intended to build. As a result, where social norms are in flux,
the agency cost of delegating enforcement to others is actually a benefit.
* Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Rachel Barkow, Yochai Benkler,
Adriaan Lanni, Irina Manta, and Susannah Barton Tobin for helpful comments, to Terry Fisher and the late
Bill Stuntz for feedback during this project's earliest stages, and to the University of Houston Law Center's
Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law for funding through its Sponsored Scholarship Grant
program. @ 2014, Joseph P. Fishman.
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INTRODUCTION
Industries dependent on copyright protection have always been in the business
of creating new works. Recently, they have also been in the business of creating
norms. In their attempts to change permissive attitudes toward copyright in-
fringement, trade groups such as the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") and the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") have become
examples of what sociologist Howard Becker calls a "moral entrepreneur," an
enterprising crusader who seeks to change existing social norms regarding par-
ticular conduct.' Criminologists 2 and copyright scholars3 alike have begun to note
that rightsholders are seeking to build consensus on how intellectual property fits
into popular notions of right and wrong, waging what has been described as "a
moral and ideological battle for the hearts and minds of an increasingly global
public."' Rightsholders want to disseminate a moral rule against infringement.
That makes them, in Becker's terms, rule creators.5
Rule creators need not be, and often are not, legislators. A "rule" in this sense
is a social norm, rather than law. At the same time, the law remains the classic
Beckerian tool of moral entrepreneurship. Rule creators spread norms by convinc-
ing lawmakers to adopt legal commands that express those norms. 6
According to Becker, these rule creators are not the only participants in moral
entrepreneurship. Those who succeed in translating norms into formal prohibitions
typically require a set of enforcers to administer those prohibitions, an executive
branch of moral enterprise.7 Thus, for example, early Prohibitionists depended on
local police forces following the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, and
anti-drug crusaders relied on the Federal Bureau of Narcotics ("FBN") after the
1. HowARD S. BECKER, OUTsIERs: STUDIES IN THE Socioi.(xiy oi DIvANCE 145, 147 (1973). Richard Posner
used the term "moral entrepreneur" somewhat differently in his Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,
Ill HARV. L. Rliv. 1637, 1664-67 (1998), referring to a particular subset of legal academics. Posner does not
reference Becker's work, though the concepts are similar. See David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now,
43 WARE FOREST L. REv. 283, 311-13 (2008) (discussing the potential relationship between Posner and Becker).
2. See e.g., Majid Yar, Teenage Kicks or Virtual Villainy? Internet Piracy, Moral Entrepreneurship and the
Social Construction of a Crime Problem, in CRIME ONLINE 95 (Yvonne Jewkes ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yar,
Teenage Kicks]; Majid Yar, The Rhetorics and Myths of Anti-Piracy Campaigns: Criminalization, Moral
Pedagogy and Capitalist Property Relations in the Classroom, 10 NEw MEDIA & Soc. 605 (2008) [hereinafter Yar,
Rhetorics and Myths].
3. See, e.g., WILIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright
and Confitzzling Rhetoric, 13 VANI. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 883-84 (2011) (observing that the entertainment
industry "emphasizes moral high grounds while noting the wrongfulness of online file sharing and the resulting
economic damage").
4. Lawrence B. Solum, The Future of Copyright, 83 TEX. L. Riv. 1137, 1139 (2005) (book review).
5. See BECKER, supra note 1, at 147-48.
6. To be sure, norms frequently develop without interference from law. See, e.g., RoBERTC. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAw (1991) (examining how rules develop in the cattle industry in Shasta County). Becker's focus,
however, is on the development of norms through legal reform. See BlICKlIR, supra note 1, at 155.
7. See BlCKER, supra note 1, at 155 ("With the creation of a new set of rules we often find that a new set of
enforcement agencies and officials is established.").
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agency's inception in the 1930s.'
In a limited sense, U.S. copyright law hews to this scheme. Federal prosecutors
have enforced copyright law since 1897, when Congress first criminalized willful
infringement for profit.9 The scope of copyright's substantive criminal law has
since steadily expanded, particularly over the last two decades.'o Legislation such
as the No Electronic Theft Act of 1997 ("NET Act")" and the Artists' Rights
and Theft Prevention Act of 2005 ("ART Act")12 has tasked the federal govern-
ment with an increasing role in defining intellectual-property deviance. Through
criminal prosecution under § 506 of the Copyright Act, prosecutors in the Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ") exercise discretion as the rightsholders' agents in moral
entrepreneurship.
At the same time, however, the civil enforcement scheme under § 501 of the
Copyright Act elides this separation of powers.' 3 Private causes of action against
infringers allow the rule creators to serve as their own enforcers.' 4 Whether
anti-piracy advocates are lobbying Congress for new civil penalties'" or pressing
for more widespread adherence to existing law, they are empowered to police
that law themselves, as the RIAA and MPAA have done through thousands of
lawsuits against individual file-sharers. The creator need not depend on the
enforcer because creator and enforcer are one and the same.
Between its criminal and civil remedial schemes, the Copyright Act allows
two different paradigms of moral entrepreneurship to operate in parallel: one
entrusts legal enforceability to the original crusaders while the other assigns it to
the state. The result is that both the original rule creators and their conscripts
in the DOJ can use infringement litigation to try to map out copyright's moral
boundaries.
8. Id. We now know the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as the Drug Enforcement Administration.
9. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
10. For a recent historical survey of the criminalization of copyright violations, see Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle
of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469,481-85 (2011).
11. Pub. L. No. 105-147, Ill Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B) (2012)).
12. Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 103, 119 Stat. 218, 220-21 (2005) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(C) (2012)).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
14. See id. Of course, quite apart from their value as tools of moral entrepreneurship, private infringement
actions also serve their traditional purpose of making the infringed party whole and, if appropriate, enjoining
future acts of infringement. Most private copyright infringement actions (like private actions of any kind) seek
nothing more than redress for the particular injury alleged in the complaint. As discussed below in Part IA, suits
against end users are unusual insofar as they are driven less by the promise of compensation from the individual
defendants than by rule enforcement against the public. This fact distinguishes them from lawsuits against
intermediaries such as the makers of file-sharing platforms. Rightsholders' actions against intermediaries seek not
so much to sway hearts and minds as simply to eliminate the product that enables the infringement altogether. See,
e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Arista Records, LLC v. Lime Group, LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). This Article is therefore
concerned primarily with actions against end users.
15. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
2014] 361
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In this Article, I examine which of these distributions of power has proven more
effective at instilling a norm against copyright infringement. It has by now become
a relatively uncontroversial proposition that private lawsuits against individual
file-sharers have been a self-defeating exercise for plaintiffs. 6 Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, many feared that criminalizing a greater variety of infringements would
only magnify the missteps of private civil litigation.' 7 Industry insiders' confi-
dence that infringers would face criminal prosecution was matched by onlookers'
confidence that backlash would follow.' Yet in the years since, prosecutors'
judicious deployment of state resources is proving both of those early forecasts
wrong. Contrary to these predictions, the DOJ has been a more productive enforcer
than the rightsholders whose interests it represents. Despite an apparent mandate
from Congress and the moral entrepreneurs in the entertainment industries, federal
prosecutors are not targeting individual downloaders, even ones with prolific
amounts of infringing content on their hard drives. Instead, they have pursued
commercial pirates and "warez" traders, large-scale syndicates that operate clan-
destinely and specialize in the distribution of pre-release material. By selectively
focusing on unsympathetic defendants engaged in activities foreign to the casual
peer-to-peer downloader, prosecutors are--consciously or not-defining deviance
while avoiding the backlash that has greeted civil plaintiffs. They have avoided the
mistake of spreading opprobrium too thin.'
This story offers a lesson concerning what I call the separated powers of moral
entrepreneurship. In making the descriptive point that moral entrepreneurs often
depend on a professional class of enforcers, Becker never reflects on what qualities
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, The Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Thef Act and Criminal Copyright
Infringement, 82 OR. L. Ri:v. 369, 392-96 (2003) (summarizing early fears over the NET Act, including abuse of
prosecutorial discretion, overdeterrence, and disproportionate burdens on juveniles and universities); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. Rniv. 1003, 1109 (2001) (expressing doubt about the efficacy
of merely "prosecuting crime as it happens," and arguing that true prevention of cybercrime will only come with
"realspace monitoring and inculcation provided by parents, peers, and others"); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining
Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Anialysis: The Exainple of Crininal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. Raiv.
783 (2005); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'i. L. & Poi.. 219, 224 (1996) ("[S]eeking to control public behavior by threatening punishment is
insufficient to gain widespread public compliance with the law. Unfortunately, authorities in the area of
intellectual property use this strategy widely.").
18. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on
the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. Raiv. 505, 545 (2003) (observing that "[wihile large-scale file-sharers
might be prosecuted, it is widely believed that the public could not stomach widespread prosecutions of individual
computer users who had illicitly downloaded copyrighted content"); Richard Barry, Jail Term for MP3 Pirates
Predicted, ZDNiET (May 16, 2000, 12:50 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/jail-term-for-mp3-pirates-predicted-
3002078982 (quoting a music industry executive's claim that students downloading MP3s illegally would be
prosecuted "as a clear signal that piracy will not be tolerated in the US" and a music journalist's claim that such
prosecutions, while inevitable, would "backfire" and create "such an outcry").
19. A notable exception to this trend is the widely criticized Aaron Swartz prosecution. As I discuss below, the
enforcement choices in that case may very well have had more to do with a perceived affront to the rule of law
than with the normative content of the underlying law being violated. See infra Part IV.D.
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predict effective enforcement. 2 0 Nor, for that matter, have the successive genera-
tions of sociologists who have drawn on his work ' or legal scholars interested in
law's expressive function.2 2 Copyright's different remedial schemes provide a case
study whose results may help fill that gap. Those results suggest that Becker's
descriptive division between rule creators and rule enforcers may turn out to be
prescriptively desirable. Inhibiting the original moral crusaders from pursuing
every case that offends them may prevent their message from becoming too radical
for society to bear. It allows a moral rule to filter through the views of others who,
while committed to upholding it, possess a more tempered view of the moral
content underlying it. This separation of powers provides a check on the sometimes-
unrealistic desires of rule creators-and, in doing so, may prevent those creators
from running in reverse.
Separating legislative and executive functions is thus a positive structural design
not only for governing through law, but also for governing through norms. A
division between legislature and executive has traditionally been justified on the
theory that otherwise onerous laws can be neutralized at the enforcement stage. By
exercising its institutional discretion over enforcement decisions, an independent
executive ensures that the law is not dominated by the legislature's sometimes
ill-advised agendas. Moral entrepreneurship can work much the same way. Rule
creators' crusades, even if history eventually judges them as laudable, may race too
far ahead of contemporary norms and result in self-defeat. Ceding the executive
role to another counteracts this tendency.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly summarizes the literature on the
role of social norms in shaping individuals' decisions to comply with or violate the
law. Part II outlines how current efforts to curb online copyright infringement
represent a form of Beckerian moral entrepreneurship. Part III discusses two
potential distributions of power over rule enforcement and an example of each:
(A) aggregating it within the institutions that fought for new rules in the first place,
represented by the RIAA's litigation campaign against individual file-sharers; and
(B) assigning it to the discretion of the state, represented by federal criminal
prosecutions. Of these options, I argue that the former has been counterproductive
in trying to entrench a broad social norm against infringement, while the latter has
made headway in trying to articulate a narrower one. Part IV asks what preliminary
takeaways the moral crusade over copyright infringement might offer for future
moral entrepreneurs when social norms are in flux. I contend that, because
professional enforcers tend to lack the moral fervor of the rule creators, they are
20. See BElCKIER, supra note I.
21. See Pozen, supra note 1, at 311 n. 139 (noting that subsequent scholars who have applied Becker's concept
of moral entrepreneurship seem almost always to have in mind the rule creators rather than the rule enforcers).
22. See Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enjoircement. 61 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014). The expressivist
literature, to which Eisenberg's study of hate crime prosecutions is a notable exception, typically focuses on
legislative enactment but overlooks enforcement practices.
2014] 363
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better equipped to foresee backlash when particular enforcement activities are out
of step with widely held social norms. I argue that this theory of separated moral
entrepreneurship powers is further corroborated by other historical examples of
selective enforcement. Finally, I discuss circumstances in which a separation of
powers between rule creator and rule enforcer is likely to have little effect on
whether self-defeating rule enforcement occurs.
1. THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL NORMS TO DETERRENCE-BASED
ENFORCEMENT REGIMES
The traditional economic theory of deterrence, most often expressed in the
context of criminal sanctions, states that rational actors who are otherwise pre-
disposed to violate a rule will adjust their behavior to comply with the rule in
response to an expected penalty.2 3 A penalty, even an incarceratory one, is nothing
more than a cost to be incurred by the rule breaker. So long as the benefits from
breaking a rule outweigh the costs, a rational actor will break the rule. Raise the
cost, however, and the incentives to break the rule diminish. As a result, an
enforcer need only ratchet up the probability or severity of that penalty to some
optimal level in order to deter noncompliance. On the basis of this theory, some
have argued that increasing the certainty of punishment could effectively contain
peer-to-peer copyright infringement.24
Yet this standard cost-benefit account is complicated by the effect that social
norms play in shaping individuals' attitudes toward rule breaking. Social psy-
chology has shown that an individual is most likely to comply with a rule if he
perceives that other community members comply with it as well. 2 5 Fear of
disapproval from peers, it turns out, is a far more potent determinant of compliance
than fear of punishment at the hands of law enforcement.2 6 As a result, the
economic cost of breaking a rule cannot be measured without reference to the level
of stigma that a particular community attaches to it. For any given rate and severity
of punishment, an individual will be more likely to obey the rule if he belongs to a
group that values adherence to it.2 7 Dan Kahan has therefore cautioned that "an
account of deterrence that abstracts from meaning-by, say, considering only how
23. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE EcONOMICS OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1, 9-12 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent
Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, I J. LEGAL STuD. 259, 265 (1972).
24. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1345, 1391-93 (2004).
25. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 354-56 (1997)
[hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence]; Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime,
27 J. LEGAL STun. 609, 611 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Meaning and Crime]; Kenworhey Bilz & Janice
Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL EcoNoMics
AND THE LAw (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds.) (forthcoming).
26. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 25, at 354.
27. For the canonical statement of the theory that people obey laws because of perceived normative legitimacy
rather than because of fear of punishment, see ToM R. TYLER, WHY PErLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). See also Tyler,
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particular policies affect the expected penalty for wrongdoing-is bound to prove
unreliable and perhaps even self-defeating."2 8
Thus, for example, there is a wide body of literature attributing the existence of
tax evasion to permissive social norms.29 When taxpayers are honest on their tax
returns, it is because they believe it is the moral thing to do. And they are more
likely to believe it is the moral thing to do if they perceive that their peers are
likeminded. 3 0 Efforts to deter dishonesty on tax returns therefore have weak
effects when existing social norms approve of such behavior, and strong effects
when existing social norms disapprove of it. In sum, the threat of sanctions deters
best when the imposition of sanctions is widely viewed as legitimate.3 '
Indeed, as discussed in greater detail below, a deterrence regime that races too
far ahead of prevailing social norms may even have the self-defeating effect of
increasing non-compliance in unexpected ways. 3 2 Imposing sanctions that are
perceived to be unjust may mobilize opposition and foment backlash, further
strengthening the norm that tolerated noncompliance in the first place. A prohibi-
tion that deviates far from a normative consensus risks alienating not only the
subjects of that prohibition, but also those who have discretion over how to enforce
it. As Paul Robinson and John Darley have explained in the criminal law context:
The criminal justice system depends on those involved in it (offenders, judges,
jurors, witnesses, prosecutors, police, and others) for its operation. For the
system to function effectively, these people must cooperate or, at least,
acquiesce to the system's demands. Otherwise, if the system is regarded as
being in conflict with justice or simply failing to do justice, this critical
cooperation or acquiescence may diminish or cease to exist at all. Moreover, to
the degree that these deviations from justice are frequent and morally conse-
quential, active forces of subversion and resistance are generated in the
community.33
supra note 17, at 224; Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
267, 269 (2014).
28. Kahan, Social Meaning and Crime, supra note 25.
29. See, e.g., Michael Wenzel, The Social Side of Sanctions: Personal and Social Norms as Moderators of
Deterrence, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 547 (2004); Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence
Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PErPLi PAY TAXES 193, 212-13 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992).
30. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 25, at 354; Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation to
the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE PAY
TAXES, supra note 29, at 9, 29-30.
31. Wenzel, supra note 29, at 561-64. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the punishment of common
law crimes. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 25, at 354.
32. See infra Part W.A.
33. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice
Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 23 (2007); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert,
91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 482 (1997) (describing the process through which expanding criminal law to cover
socially accepted conduct first "weakens the stigmatizing effect that that expansion seeks to enlist" and then
"destroys the stigmatizing effect" as "criminal penalties for non-condemnable conduct cause the public to
2014]1 365
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It follows that the best way to alter society's conduct is to alter society's norms.
How individuals and institutions might undertake that project is the focus of the
following Part.
II. COPYRIGHT CRUSADERS 34 AS MORAL ENTREPRENEURS
Becker's central thesis is that "social groups create deviance by making the
rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to
particular people and labeling them as outsiders."" The initial perception of de-
viance, what Stanley Cohen would later coin a "moral panic," 36 does not bubble up
organically on its own. It requires a concerted initiative. And the groups that take
this initiative are Becker's moral entrepreneurs.
Although contemporary legal scholars seldom trace the concept of moral
entrepreneurship to Becker, it should nonetheless be familiar to them. Becker's
theory of deviance anticipates the "law and social norms" movement that emerged
in the 1990s. 37 Becker's concept of "rule" is what legal scholars recognize as a
social norm. In 1996, when Cass Sunstein wrote that "[e]xisting social conditions
are often more fragile than might be supposed" and identified the "norm entre-
preneur" as the agent interested in changing the norms that enable those social
sympathize with the person charged, and to despise the legal system that brings the charge"); Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Role ofDeterrence in the Fonnulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its
Best, 91 Gtio. L.J. 949, 985-89 (2003) (positing same thesis). For an application of these general principles to
copyright law, see Moohr, supra note 17.
34. While I use the term -copyright crusader" for its Beckerian overtones, the Business Software Alliance has
actually created a cartoon character known as The Copyright Crusader, who traverses cyberspace teaching kids
that infringement is distinctly uncool. For reasons not entirely clear to me, our masked vigilante is a ferret.
BUSINESS SOFTWARE Ai.iIANcl, COPYRIGHT CRUSADER TO THE Riiscut, available at https://public.rcas.org/hs/shs/
staffwebsites/reynodeb/ICT%202/Shared%20Documients/Unit%203%20Digital%20CitizenshiplCyberafetyffG-
CopyrightCrusader-2005.pdf.
35. BECKER, supra note 1, at 9.
36. STANLEY COHEN, FoLK Djivii.s AND MORAL PANICS (2002). Cohen's formulation is now canonical in the
field of criminology:
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode,
person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests;
its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral
barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially
accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more
often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more
visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which
has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight.
Id. at 1. For more on Cohen's distinctive contributions to the study of deviance, see Nachman Ben-Yehuda,
Foreword, Moral Panics-36 Years On, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOI.iX;Y I (2009).
37. See, e.g, E.i.ICKSON, supra note 6; ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIA. NoRMS (2000); Dan M. Kahan Gentle
Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. Rtiv. 607 (2000) [hereinafter Kahan,
Gentle Nudges]; Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 25; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Nonns, 96 MICH. L. RIiv. 338 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Col.uM.
L. Raiv. 903 (1996).
[Vol. 51:359366
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conditions, he was essentially identifying the Beckerian moral entrepreneur by a
different name.
Becker distinguishes between two "related species": rule creators and rule en-
forcers.39 This Part discusses how each fits into the current controversies over
copyright infringement.
A. Rule Creators
The rule creator is the sparkplug of moral enterprise, a "crusading reformer"
bent on changing the normative convictions of society:
He is interested in the content of rules. The existing rules do not satisfy him
because there is some evil which profoundly disturbs him. He feels that
nothing can be right in the world until rules are made to correct it. He operates
with an absolute ethic; what he sees is truly and totally evil with no
qualification. Any means is justified to do away with it. The crusader is fervent
and righteous, often self-righteous.40
There is no ethical valence to the act of rule creation. Rule creators have
catalyzed both our greatest strides forward and our greatest failed social experi-
ments, from Abolitionism to Prohibitionism. A rule creator might be a "meddling
busybody" or a high-minded humanitarian. 4 1 Rule creation simply represents an
enterprising commitment to changing society-for better or for worse.
It is unclear how much room exists for financial self-interest in Becker's
framework. He distinguishes the profit-driven industrialists who backed Prohibi-
tion from the Prohibitionists themselves. Only the latter, he argues, are true rule
creators; the former are merely their accomplices.42 Today, however, many
sociologists of deviance concede that while rule creators may argue their case to
society with the force of a moral imperative, they are inevitably motivated to some
extent by sociopolitical and financial factors.4 3 As Becker himself puts it, any
practice may be "harmful in an objective sense to the group in which it occurs"; the
moral crusade lies in getting people to "be made to feel that something ought to be
done about it.""
The content industries' effort to recalibrate society's moral compass concerning
infringement is a good example of a financially motivated moral crusade. Rights-
holders allege that piracy impoverishes artists whose ability to earn a livelihood
38. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 909, 929.
39. BI;CKER, supra note 1, at 147.
40. Id. at 147-48.
41. Id. at 148.
42. Id. at 148-50.
43. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 36, at 104 (arguing that even the "genuine crusader" is "nmoved by righteous
indignation as well as self-interest"); ERICH GOxmi & NACHMAN BEN-YEIHUIDA, MORAL PANics 81 (1994); Yar,
Teenage Kicks, supra note 2, at 95.
44. BECKER, supra note 1, at 162.
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ought to be protected.45 At the same time, rightsholders are appealing to society's
broader notions of justice and fair play.4 6 Majid Yar has documented the process
by which trade associations have attempted to use advocacy and rhetoric that
would elicit broad moral opprobrium against piracy. 47 Yar catalogs a wide list of
entrepreneurial efforts, including recoding infringement as a form of thievery and
parasitism, 4 8 linking it with terrorism and the Mafia,4 9 playing on the audience's
sense of guilt,50 and making parents feel responsibility as moral pedagogues. 5' The
master of such tactics was Jack Valenti, the longtime chief lobbyist of the MPAA.
Best remembered for his less-than-prescient testimony to Congress in 1982 that
"the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston
strangler is to the woman home alone,"5 2 Valenti set the rhetorical standard for the
moral panics of copyright.
One powerful device that these rule creators deployed early on is the word
"piracy," which, like the word "espionage" in the trade secrecy context, 54 has been
a rhetorical coup for rightsholders. As Peter Drahos and John Brathwaite have
45. See, e.g., David Lieberman, How Dangerous Are Pirates?: Music Industry Blames Dying Sales on
Copying, USA TonAY, Apr. 5, 2002, at B l; Who Music Theft Hurts, RIAA, http://riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (highlighting a "credible study by the Institute for Policy Innovation" that "pegs the
annual harm at $12.5 billion dollars in losses to the U.S. economy as well as more than 70,000 lost jobs and
$2 billion in lost wages to American workers"); Frequently Asked Questions, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/
contentprotection/faq (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (identifying the movie industry as one of the main victims of
piracy); John Healey et al., Song Swappers Face the Music, L.A. TIMEs (Sept. 9, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/
print/2003/sep/09/business/fi-riaa9 (quoting RIAA executive's statement that "when you are being victimized by
illegal activity, there comes a time when you have to stand up and take appropriate action").
I take no position here on the disputed allegation that file-sharing has significantly undercut revenue. Compare
Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Inftingement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and
Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. Riv. 731, 754-55 (2003) (describing the difficulty in measuring the extent to which
piracy actually hurts sales), and Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record
Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. Poi.. EcON. 1, 1 (2007) (arguing that downloads have an effect on sales which
is statistically indistinguishable from zero), with Stan J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just
Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 3 n.5 (2006) (disagreeing with Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf analysis),
and Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High Cs: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and
Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 49 J.L. & ECON. 29 (2006) (finding that illegal downloading
among students at American universities between 2003 and 2004 reduced individuals' legitimate purchases by
approximately 20%).
46. See Yar, Rhetorics and Myths, supra note 2, at 608 (describing the creative content industries' repeated
citations of financial loss as "discursive strategies for attempting to construct a political and public consensus
about the immorality of piracy").
47. Yar, Teenage Kicks, supra note 2, at 100-04; Yar, Rhetorics and Myths, supra note 2, 610-19.
48. Yar, Teenage Kicks, supra note 2, at 101-03.
49. Id.
50. Id.
S1. Id. at 103-04; Yar, Rhetorics and Myths, supra note 2, at 618-19.
52. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250,
H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the
H. Comnn. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti).
53. See PATRY, supra note 3, at 139-58 (explaining how Jack Valenti successfully employed folk devils and
moral panics before Congress in an effort to protect against copyright infringement).
54. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2012) (as amended).
2014] COPYRIGHT & MORAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 369
observed, "[t]o be called an intellectual property pirate is to be condemned. In a
world where attention spans are divided by the media into ten-second sound bites it
is the perfect word to use on TV, videocassettes, newspaper headlines and the
radio."55 Today, one cannot address copyright infringement without encountering
the piracy trope. It has saturated copyright discussions in the popular press, 6
policy debates," academia, legislation, 59 and court decisions.6 0 Indeed, one
court recently went so far as to conclude that "piracy" has become the only viable
term for describing willful copyright infringement. 6 1
The near-ubiquity with which this term has been adopted is an example of what
Stanley Cohen refers to as "spurious attribution," an initial stage of stigmatization
through emotive symbols. 6 2 By branding infringers as pirates, a term that took on
added salience in April 2009 when pirates of the nautical variety captured a U.S.
55. PiETR DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM 28 (2002); see also PATRY, supra note 3,
at 91-96 (highlighting the appeal of the pirate metaphor); STEPHEN WADDAMs, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATi LAw
175-76 (2003) (explaining that the choice of piracy rhetoric is significant because it shows "the persuasive power
of proprietary concepts"); Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Law Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
Airs 61, 63-64 (2002) (describing how rhetorical devices like piracy and sharing have played a strong role for
both copyright owners and users); Patricia Loughlan, Pirates, Parasites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits, Foxes. . . The
Metaphors of Intellectual Property, 28 SYoNFY L. Rtiv. 211, 217-220 (2006) (noting that the use of the piracy
metaphor in intellectual property discourse is extends beyond instances of unlawful copying by the pirate); Jessica
Litman, Address at the Tenth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy: The Demonization of Piracy
(Apr. 6, 2000), available at http://www-personal.umich.edul-jdlitman/papers/demon.pdf (arguing that content
owners have been winning the battles of terminology and metaphors).
56. See, e.g., Editorial, Moving Against Movie Piracy, L.A. TimIs (Dec. 19, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/dec/19/opinion/la-ed-piracyl9-2009dec 19; Lawrence Lessig, In Defense of Piracy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11,
2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl22367645363324303; Strategies to Sink the Music Pirates, THE
AUSTRALIAN, July 18, 2003, at 10; Thanks, Me Hearties: Media Firms Find That Statistics On Internet Piracy Can
Be Rather Useful, THE EcONoMIsT (July 17, 2008), http://www.economist.com/ 11751035/.
57. See, e.g., David Kravets, Recording Industry Decries AM-FM Broadcasting as "A Form ofPiracy," WIRED
(Jun. 23, 2008), http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/06/recording-indus.html (quoting recording industry
spokesperson's statement that the statutory provision exempting terrestrial radio broadcasters from paying artist
performance royalties is piracy).
58. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won't Behave: Regulating P2P in the Decade After Napster,
40 RuTma:s L.J. 565 (2009).
59. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of
1982, Pub. L. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, 93 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 17 U.S.C.).
60. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 549 (1973) (discussing defendants engaged in "what has
commonly been called 'record piracy' or 'tape piracy'-the unauthorized duplication of recordings of perfor-
mances by major musical artists"); Dish Network L.L.C. v. Hipps, No. 1:08cv357, 2009 WL 2922865, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Sep. 8, 2009) ("[T]his court deplores piracy of protected transmissions-which the court believes
to be nothing less than pure theft .... ); Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)
("[P]iracy has changed since the Barbary days. Today, the raider need not grab the bounty with his own hands; he
need only transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax to start the presses in a distant land.").
61. United States v. Cassim, 693 F. Supp. 2d 697, 701-02 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (reasoning that "because this term
was and is commonly used to refer to the conduct in question, it will be difficult for witnesses and lawyers to
generate an adequate substitute during questioning," and on that basis denying criminal defendant's motion in
limine to exclude any use of the term "music piracy" during a criminal copyright infringement trial).
62. See COHEN, supra note 36, at 39-42.
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crew and kidnapped its captain, copyright's moral entrepreneurs play on
society's pre-existing moral outrage against others already defined as criminals. It
is not so much a descriptive move as a prescriptive one; spurious attribution helps
secure widespread acceptance of moral propositions that are initially held by few
besides the rule creators themselves.6 4 To be sure, as pirates have become more
glamorous in mainstream culture over the past decade, the stigmatizing potential
of the trope has waned. 5 Whether still potent or not, however, copyright owners'
rhetorical emphasis on piracy is an attempt to mold social norms.
Such rhetorical warfare demonstrates that rule creation need not require the
adoption of positive law. To be sure, successful campaigns often produce new
legislation. But the rules that creators design may also operate at the level of social
condemnation, ostracizing some whose behavior is nonetheless lawful (or, in the
case of the millions of copyright infringers who have never faced legal action,
unlawful though unpunished).66 With or without written law, such social stigma is
a powerful, even necessary mechanism for successful entrepreneurship.67 Copy-
right crusaders recognize this. After all, unlike Becker's iconic rule creators who
63. Shortly after the kidnapping, a public-relations officer for the Business Software Alliance touted its new
"Faces of Internet Piracy" campaign with the following statement:
We've all been following the events of the past week of the pirates off the Horn of Africa. Piracy
takes many forms, some more violent than others. I wanted to let you know that the Business
Software Alliance is launching a new campaign today "Faces of Internet Piracy" that shows the
real-life impact of software piracy-from hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines to jail time.
Click on the picture below to learn more about the campaign . .. let me know if you're interested
in writing about this.
Gordon Haff, BSA Equates Software Pirates to Somali Pirates, CNET Ntws (Apr. 13, 2009), http://news.cnet.con
8301-13556_3-10217889-61.htmil. Seizing on the moral disparity between kidnappers and copyright infringers,
several blogs and newspapers began to question the propriety of the metaphor. See Stephen J. Dubner, Is It Time to
Rename Digital Piracy?, FREAKONOMICS Bi.tx; (Apr. 13, 2009, 11:50 AM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/04/13/is-it-time-to-rename-digital-piracy/; Bobbie Johnson, Is It Time to Stop Using the Word 'Piracy'?,
THi GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/apr/16/piracy; Rob Pegoraro, Who
Are You Calling a Software Pirate?, FASTER FoRWARD (Apr. 14, 2009, 2:08 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com-
fasterforward/2009/04/whoare-youscalling a software.html. Nevertheless, the term has shown no signs of
losing traction with the public.
64. See PATRY, supra note 3, at 88; Litman, supra note 55. Infringers engage in an equal but opposite rhetorical
move when they identify peer-to-peer downloads as "sharing." See Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 63 (describing
how "Napster brought us a new kind of 'sharing,' one in which recipients could enjoy the giver's munificence,
while the giver never had to give anything up" and "[e]veryone benefited; everyone, that is, except the creators
and owners of the copied works").
65. See Yu, supra note 3, at 927-28 (contrasting the negative connotation of piracy among policymakers with
its positive connotation among children and teenagers).
66. See Goomi & BEIN-YLHUDA, supra note 43, at 81-82 (cataloging various extra-legal tools used by rule
creators). Becker's case study on extra-legal constructions of deviance concerns dance musicians, whose way of
life was "sufficiently bizarre and unconventional for them to be labeled as outsiders by more conventional
members of the community." BECKER, supra note 1, at 79. For examples of attempts to stigmatize lawful activity
in the copyright sphere, see Kravets, supra note 57; Loughlan, supra note 55, at 218.
67. See Tyler, supra note 17, at 226-27 (arguing that without a "public feeling that breaking intellectual
property laws is wrong ... there is little reason for people to follow intellectual property laws").
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waged war against marijuana and alcohol, copyright's rule creators had the law on
their side from the start. The illegality of infringement was already on the books
when A&M Records sued Napster in 1999, jumpstarting the modern campaign
against file-sharing.' 8 The content industries' moral enterprise ultimately aims to
instill values that make compliance voluntary.69
All this notwithstanding, passing new law remains the primary mechanism by
which moral entrepreneurs attempt to sew these rules into society's moral fabric.
Goode and Ben-Yehuda put it bluntly: "[w]henever the question 'What is to be
done?' is asked concerning behavior deemed threatening, someone puts forth
the suggestion, 'There ought to be a law."' 70 The law, especially the criminal law,
is often the first tool in the moral entrepreneur's kit because nothing else so
clearly draws a line between good and evil. 7 1 Law can be educative in ways that
advocacy alone cannot. This power to communicate blameworthiness marks not
only enforcement, discussed in more detail below, but also enactment. Laws
themselves can be expressive symbols of an underlying norm. Even statutes'
titles can convey a message.
So the content industries did what any sensible moral entrepreneur would
do-they lobbied for more law.7 4 And they succeeded. In 1997, Congress passed
the NET Act, which for the first time exposed non-commercial infringers to
68. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Though the case presented novel issues concerning a file-sharing network's
secondary liability for its users' infringing conduct, there was never any question that unauthorized copying and
distribution of a copyrighted musical work are core violations. To the extent that individual users' direct
infringement was an unsettled question prior to the Napster litigation, it was only unsettled as to whether their
activities were protected as fair use. The district court, followed by the Ninth Circuit, clarified that they were not.
See 239 F3d at 1012-19. Even before the Napster decision, the leading case in the field had held that file-sharing
was an obvious case of infringement. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350
(S.D.N.Y 2000) ("The complex marvels of cyberspatial communication may create difficult legal issues; but not
in this case. Defendant's infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights is clear.").
69. Cf: Tyler, supra note 17, at 224 (explaining that "seeking to control public behavior by threatening
punishment is insufficient to gain widespread public compliance with the law" and suggesting that instead, "[flor
an effective strategy to deal with public compliance, we need to have a situation in which citizens voluntarily obey
the law").
70. Goxmi: & BEN-YIHUDA, supra note 43, at 82.
71. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlaw/id" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crine
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Ri. 193, 200 (1991); William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA.
L. Riv. 1871, 1891 (2000) ("Criminal law tends to be the first place groups turn when they want the legal system's
blessing, because that blessing tends often to take the form of condemning those on the other side.").
72. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. Rliv 505, 531-32 (2001)
(describing the phenomenon of symbolic criminalization).
73. See Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 HARY.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rt:v. 67, 69 (2006) (noting that the statute's title "often seems like a trope-words conveying a
symbolic meaning, in this case engaging a set of political attitudes, rather than a literal reference to a piece of
legislation").
74. See Goldman, supra note 17, at 373.
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criminal penalties for large-scale activity.75 One year later, Congress passed the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, outlawing the sale and dissemination of
technology that could be used to circumvent digital rights management, regardless
of whether a user might have a legal right to copy the underlying work.7 6 In 2005,
it passed the ART Act, which targets online infringement of pre-release works by
strengthening the existing criminal penalties and eliminating the NET Act's
monetary and numeric minimum thresholds for any pre-release works distributed
on a computer network. 7 And in 2008, Congress passed the Prioritizing Resources
and Organization for Intellectual Property Act, which increased the government's
forfeiture powers in copyright cases.
With the development of this criminal-law arsenal to supplement copyright's
traditional private remedies for infringement under § 501, the rule creators further
embedded their desired rules into the law of the land. Still remaining was the
concrete application of these rules to particular violators in order to actually police
the borders that had been drawn. That task would fall to the rule enforcers.
B. Rule Enforcers
Becker conceives of the rule enforcer as a separate figure from the rule creator.
The enforcer, typically a policeman or public prosecutor, is the authority that
allows "the abstract class of outsiders created by the rule [to] be peopled."7 9 By
branding specific actors as beyond the pale, he signals what behavior ought to be
stigmatized and punished.
The enforcer's objectives remain distinct from the rule creator's in that:
He is not so much concerned with the content of any particular rule as he is
with the fact that it is his job to enforce the rule . . .. The enforcer, then, may
not be interested in the content as such, but only in the fact that the existence of
the rule provides him with a job, profession, a raison d'8tre.8 0
This disjunction between the interests of the creator and the enforcer produces
agency costs, as the enforcer develops an independent agenda:
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B) (2012) (criminalizing infringement "by the reproduction or distribution,
including electronic means, during any 180-period, of one or more copies or phonorecords of one or more
copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000"). Previously, infringement had only risen
to the level of a criminal violation if it had been undertaken for commercial advantage or financial gain. See
United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 540 n.8 (D. Mass. 1994).
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)-(b), 1202, 1204 (2012).
77. Id. § 506(a)(1)(C).
78. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008).
79. BECKER, supra note 1, at 163. One commentator describes the rule enforcer as "work[ing] not to
promulgate new moral standards but to administer those standards once in place." Pozen, supra note 1,
at 311 n.139.
80. BECKER, supra note 1, at 156.
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Ordinarily, the rule enforcer has a great deal of discretion in many areas,
if only because his resources are not sufficient to cope with the volume of
rule-breaking he is supposed to deal with. This means that he cannot tackle
everything at once and to this extent must temporize with evil. He cannot
do the whole job and knows it. He takes his time, on the assumption that the
problems he deals with will be around for a long while. He establishes
priorities, dealing with things in their turn, handling the most pressing
problems immediately and leaving others for later. His attitude toward his
work, in short, is professional. He lacks the naive moral fervor characteristic of
the rule creator.8 '
Lacking a stake in the content of particular rules, and charged only with ensur-
ing that others abide by them, enforcers attach their own weight to the rules. Rule
enforcers shape the ultimate content of the rule by defining a set of core violators.82
Core violators are distinguishable from technical violators, who are less worthy (or
even entirely unworthy) of stigmatization. Enforcement itself thereby becomes an
act of moral entrepreneurship in its own right.
Imperfect enforcement of the legislated rule can result from various factors,
each of which affects federal prosecution of copyright infringement. One obvious
factor, as Becker identifies, is resource constraints. For example, police forces
today cannot feasibly ticket each motorist driving above the posted speed limit
on the highway, so some range above that limit becomes the de facto limit in
its place.84 Prosecutors of intellectual property offenses must perform a similar
triage. A second factor may be tension between the rule and the enforcers'
professional ambition. Prosecutors who have the option of pursuing felonies have
81. Id. at 159. Cohen notes, however, that in some instances the enforcers may be sufficiently sensitized to the
crusade that the gap between them and the rule creators begins to fade. See COHEN, supra note 36, at 59-65.
82. BECKER, supra note 1, at 161-62.
83. Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert H. Jackson,
U.S. Attorney General, Address at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940))
("One of the greatest difficulties of the position of prosecutor is that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor
can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives complaints.").
84. See Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1395, 1404-05 (2002). Raymond
quotes one police chief's incredulity at a website suggesting that seven miles above the speed limit is a ticketable
offense: "Seven over? No ... If I wrote tickets for seven over, we'd write 10,000 tickets a year ... I'd be happy if
anybody didn't go faster than seven over." Id. at 1405 n.39.
85. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTAILTY OFFICE, INTELLECTrUAL PROPERTY: FEDERAL. ENFORCEMENT HAS
GENERALLY INCREASED, BUT AssEssING PERFORMANCE COULD STRENGTHEN LAw ENFORCEMENT EFFORTs 18, 20
(2008) (reporting that the size of the FBI's intellectual property enforcement effort is small relative to other
FBI efforts and has limited resources. Also reporting that, according to Justice Department field officials, local
U.S. Attorney's Offices set minimum value thresholds for taking intellectual property cases, in part because
U.S. Attorney's Offices have limited resources); VICr)RIA A. ESPINEL, U.S. INTELI.ECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCE-
MENT COORDINATOR, 2010 U.S. INTEumCruAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REIORT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 6 (2011) (explaining that law enforcement cannot serve as the sole
enforcer because "the sheer volume of infringing content online calls for private sector involvement"); David F.
Luckenbill & Susan L. Miller, Defending Intellectual Property: State Efforts to Protect Creative Works, 15
JUSTICE Q. 93, 114 (1998).
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historically shown reluctance to expend energy and resources toward securing
misdemeanor convictions." In June 2011, the Acting Register of Copyrights
appeared before Congress to testify in favor of felonizing unauthorized stream-
ing of copyrighted content, which is currently criminalized as a misdemeanor.
She explained that increasing the severity of the crime was necessary because
"'as a practical matter, prosecutors have little incentive to file charges for a mere
misdemeanor .... This means that . . . streaming is not only a lesser crime on the
books, it is a crime that may never be punished at all." 87 This is a familiar trope in
copyright infringement prosecution. The same problem necessitated the feloniza-
tion of software piracy in the 1990s and of audio recording and motion picture
piracy in the 1980s.8" A third reason for imperfect enforcement may be the
enforcer's normative disinterest in the rule itself. This phenomenon has been
observed in numerous subject areas of criminal law, among them domestic
violence,89 public intoxication,' 0 and, perhaps most famously, Prohibition." As I
argue below, this phenomenon is also shaping copyright infringement prosecu-
tions. The critical point for now is that, for any or all of these reasons, delegating
enforcement responsibility results in the development of a rule-as-enforced that
cannot be deduced purely from the rule-as-created.
Of all the creative content industries, the music industry has been the vanguard
of using civil litigation as a moral entrepreneurial tool against infringement.
When the RIAA sued Napster in 1999, its stated intent was not only to enjoin the
network's facilitation of copyright infringement, but also to generate public outcry
against copyright infringement.94 This latter goal proved more elusive than the
86. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby, Suppressing Domestic Violence with Law Reforns, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINoltv;Y 250, 251 (1992) (domestic violence); Margit Livingston, Desecrating The Ark: Animal Abuse and
the Law's Role in Prevention, 87 lowA L. Riiv. 1, 5 (2001) (animal cruelty).
87. Promoting Investment and Protecting Conunerce Online: The ARTAct, the NETAct and Illegal Streaming:
Hearing Before the Subconun. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Conun. on the
Judiciary, I12th Cong. 21 (2011) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Acting Register of Copyrights).
88. S. Rin. No. 102-268, at 2 (1992); see also The Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1981:
Hearing on S. 691 Before the Subconun. on Criminal Law ofthe S. Coinu. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 27 (198 1)
(joint statement of the MPAA and RIAA) (arguing for felonization of infringement offenses due to federal
prosecutors' disinterest in pursuing misdemeanor cases).
89. See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law,' of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence. 1970-1990, 83 J. CRim. L. &
CRIMINoltxiY 46, 65 (1992).
90. See Raymond, supra note 84, at 1411-12.
91. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 37, at 632.
92. See BiCKER, supra note 1, at 133.
93. See Steven A. Hetcher, The Music Industry's Failed Attempt to Influence File Sharing Norms, 7 VANo. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 10, 12 (2004). Groups within the film industry have carried on similar campaigns on a smaller
scale. See Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Normts and Enforcenent: The Case Against Copyright Litigation,
84 OR. L. Rtiv. 1127, 1133-35 (2005); David Kravets, Indie Filumnakers Site Thousands qf BitTorrent Users.
WIRED (Mar. 31, 2010, 12:16 PM), htp://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/bittorrent-legal-attack/.
94. As one industry representative put it: "There is a segment of society that does not understand that file
copying or shifting or sharing, or whatever they like to call it, is wrong. We need to continue to work to get the
message out there that it's illegal, which is why we bring cases the way we do." Hetcher, supra note 93, at 22.
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former. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an injunction that essentially
closed down Napster's operations, but a dozen other new file-sharing platforms
sprung up in its place.95 Despite well-publicized lawsuits against these networks,
users continued to engage in illegal file-sharing.9 6 Numerous studies revealed that
a significant proportion of the population did not see anything terribly wrong with
unauthorized downloading. Indeed, even a U.S. Senator casually confessed to
having used Napster.9 8 Those who did disapprove of the conduct did so too weakly
to enforce an anti-file-swapping norm through informal reprimand.99
Faced with this discouraging state of affairs, and emphasizing its previous
efforts to warn the public about the immorality and illegality of infringement,"'
the RIAA turned to a measure it had previously avoided: suing individual file-
sharers. The RIAA seeded news outlets with reports that file-sharers were risking
lawsuits.' On September 8, 2003, it followed through, suing 261 users and
subpoenaing another 1,600.102
The campaign gained immediate notoriety.os Early returns suggested that the
lawsuits were paying off, as the number of individuals engaged in peer-to-peer
file-sharing decreased significantly. '0 Some observed that in order to stamp out all
peer-to-peer infringement, rightsholders simply needed to escalate the number of
95. See JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BooM: NAI'STIER, MP3, AND THE Nitw PIONITIRS oF Music 131-49 (2001).
96. See Press Release, RIAA, Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer
Copyrighted Music Online (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.riaa.org/newsitem.php?id= 85183A9C-28F4-
19CE-BDE6-F48E206CE8A 1.
97. See. e.g., IPSOS, Professionals Know Software Piracy is Risky and Wrong; Workplace Policies Appear to
Curb Violations. Increase Compliance (Nov. 12, 2004), http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfmid= 2452;
Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Obsenations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enjorcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 238 (2002) (citing various surveys
concluding that "a large portion of the public apparently believes that violating intellectual property laws of
various sorts is not wrong").
98. See Katie Dean, Senator Wants Answers Fron RIAA, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2003), http://www.wired.com/politics/
law/news/2003/08/59862.
99. See Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 545.
100. See RIAA Press Release, supra note 96.
101. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMaiS, June 26, 2003, at A29 (full-page ad); Ryan Naraine, RIAA Targets File-Sharing in
the Workplace, INTERNETNEiWS.COM (Mar. 18,2003), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.phpl2l 12521
(describing warning letters sent to 300 U.S. companies, including specific instances of file-sharing from cor-
responding IP addresses).
102. Katie Dean, RIAA Landslide Begins, WIRiD (Sep. 8, 2003), http://www.wired.com/entertainnent/music/
news/2003/09/60345.
103. See Brett Lunceford & Shane Lunceford, Meh. The Irrelevance of Copyright in the Public Mind,
7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTEiL.L. PRor'. 33, 34 (2008).
104. Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, The Inpact of Recording Industry Suits Against Music File Swappers, Puiw
INTI:RNET& AMERICAN LwiE PRoJlicT (2004), http://www.pewtrusts.orgluploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Repons/
Society-and-theInteet/pew-internet-music-downloads010504.pdf. See also Benny Evangelista, Millions
Deleted Downlouds, SFGATi:.coM (Nov. 5, 2003, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.con/business/article/Millions-
deleted-downloads-2550735.php (citing study finding that over two million households deleted downloaded files
out of fear of legal sanction).
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individuals sued. 05 Over the next five years, the RIAA would file another 30,000
lawsuits, almost always settling out of court for several thousand dollars in
damages. 106
This multiyear effort, during which attorneys' fees far outstripped the monetary
value of the settlements, 0 7 was not designed to make rightsholders financially
whole. Instead, it was an exercise in rule enforcement. According to the RIAA's
website, "[tihe program was designed to educate fans about the law, the conse-
quences of breaking the law, and raise awareness about all the great legal sites in
the music marketplace." 0 8 The RIAA was attempting to use civil litigation, as its
outside counsel put it in 2008, to "send a message that copyright infringement is
wrong."' 09
Yet in the long run, these lawsuits did not make much of a dent in permissive
infringement norms. Surveys have shown that the litigation's deterrent effect was
short-lived and that few have heeded the RIAA's message that unauthorized
downloading is morally wrong."o Despite the creative content industries' insis-
tence that infringement is no different than theft,"' many still regard the theft of
intangibles as less blameworthy.1 2 In fact, overall levels of file-sharing have
increased.1 3 Even at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, cadets were still
regularly infringing as of 2006.114 Around that time, the former Chairman and
CEO of the RIAA conceded her concern that "the lawsuits have outlived most of
105. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 24, at 1398 (arguing that the reason that "the already substantial civil and
criminal penalties have only begun to have a deterrent effect is that for the most part they have not yet seriously
been pursued against alleged direct infringers on p2p networks").
106. The 30,000 figure includes both named and Doe suits. The total number of unique individuals sued
was 18,000. See Nate Anderson, Has the RIAA sued 18,000 People ... or 35,000?, ARS TiECHNICA (Jul. 8, 2009,
2:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/07/has-the-riaa-sued- I 8000-people-or-35000/. For a compre-
hensive, if slanted, overview of the RIAA litigation process, see Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation
Process Works, BECKERMANLIGAI.COM (Apr. 9, 2008), http://beckermanlegal.com/pdfl?file=/howriaa.htm (last
visited Feb. 3, 2014).
107. Manta, supra note 10, at 514 (noting that over three years, the RIAA paid $64 million in legal and other
expenses and recouped only $1.36 million).
108. For Students Doing Reports, RIAA, http://www.riaa.comlfaq.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
109. Heather Green, Does She Look Like a Music Pirate?, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.
businessweek.com/stories/2008-04-23/does-she-look-like-a-music-pirate.
I 10. Michael Bachmann, Lesson Spurned? Reactions of Online Music Pirates to Legal Prosecutions by the
RIAA, I INT'L J. CYBER CRIMINOIOGY 213, 224-25 (2007); see also Ville Oksanen & Mikko Villimiki, Theory of
Deterrence and Individual Behavior Can Lawsuits Control File Sharing on the Internet?, 3 Rtv. L. & EcoN. 693,
709-10 (2007) (finding that litigation cannot be used to establish any social norm with a long lasting effect on
individual behavior as long as the peer pressure pushes in the opposite direction).
111. See, e.g., Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n Am., Film and Music Industries File Suit Against Scour
com (July 20, 2000), available at http://riaa.com/print.php?id=CF90BF73-D27E-DEll-7D43-71CF88230CIE
("This is about stealing, plain and simple.").
112. See Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Community Perceptions of Theft Seriousness: A Challenge to
Model Penal Code and English Theft Act Consolidation, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 534-35 (2010).
113. Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 93, at 1135.
114. See Oliver R. Goodenough & Gregory Decker, Why Do Good People Steal Intellectual Property?, in LAw,
MIND AN) BRAIN 345, 360 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009).
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their usefulness and that the record companies need to work harder to implement a
strategy that legitimizes more [peer-to-peer] sites and expands the download and
subscription pool by working harder with the tech community to get devices and
music services to work better together."' 15
John Palfrey and others have found that acceptance of peer-to-peer sharing
of copyrighted content has persisted particularly among young people."' 6 Joel
Tenenbaum, now perhaps the most famous defendant in the RIAA's litigation
campaign thanks to a well publicized jury trial, is one such young person.
Tenenbaum infringed despite warnings from his family and college, and then
continued to infringe even in the midst of the infringement suit."' As the district
court noted in his case, "[h]e was not someone who stumbled onto a peer-to-peer
network and unknowingly found himself in trouble. He knew file-sharing was
illegal, yet persisted."'' 8
The RIAA announced in December 2008 that it was officially abandoning
its campaign."' By that point, its rule enforcement efforts had become not only
unproductive, but very likely counterproductive. As one recent experimental study
found, such punitive enforcement actually tends to strengthen a permissive
infringement norm among frequent infringers.12 0 As a result, frequent infringers
tend to download unauthorized files more-not less-if previously punished for
infringement.121 The study authors posited that as infringers "begin to identify
with the anti-copyright sub-culture, a targeted campaign against file-sharers might
generate a defensive reaction and have the counterproductive effect of strengthen-
ing the community bond and support among file sharers." 2 2 Another study found
that permissive file-sharing norms were so entrenched that enforcement may have
the self-defeating effect of encouraging users to "make up for lost time" whenever
they sensed that litigation had been temporarily suspended.123
115. Hilary Rosen, For the Record, for What It's Worth, HUFFINGTON PosT (June 4, 2006), http://archive.is/
dNYnQ.
116. John Palfrey et al., Youth, Creativity, and Copyright in the Digital Age, I INT'L J. LEARNING & MEDIA 79,
87-89 (2009) (discussing the prevalence and impact of an everybody's-doing-it mentality among young people);
JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL. 138 (2008) (citing focus group studies showing that youth perceived
no direct link between copying something and causing a loss to someone").
117. See Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 495 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that Tenenbaum
"continued the illegal downloading and distribution of copyrighted materials until at least 2007," two years after
receiving a cease and desist letter); Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2013)
("Tenenbaum carried on his activities for years in spite of numerous warnings . . . .").
118. Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 237 (D. Mass. 2009) (citation omitted).
119. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WAL. ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 122966038836021137.
120. See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL.. L. REv. 1251, 1283-88 (2011).
12 1. Id.
122. Id. at 1286; see also Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014)
("[H]arsh enforcement tactics can encourage distaste against copyright altogether and prove counterproduc-
tive . .. to decreas[ing] infringement.").
123. Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 93, at 1157.
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The attack on potential customers has also proved to be a public-relations quag-
mire. 124 Newspapers have profiled particularly sympathetic defendants, including
invalids, single mothers, and twelve-year-old honors students downloading nurs-
ery rhymes, all the while portraying the recording industry as bullying, draconian,
and pitiless.' 2 5 Some musicians, whose interests the RIAA professes to advocate,
have proceeded to rally in support of infringers, arguing that peer-to-peer distribu-
tion could not possibly be less remunerative than signing away rights to record
companies.' 26 One judge publicly lamented that "potentially meritorious legal and
factual defenses are not being litigated, and instead, the federal judiciary is being
used as a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs to pound settlements out of
unrepresented defendants."1 2 7
In short, the copyright crusaders have generated their own resistance.' 28 The
recording industry has by now become a cautionary tale for other content owners
facing their own piracy threats.' 29 Do not lightly assume the enforcer's mantle, the
lesson goes, lest you amplify the deviance you are trying to suppress.
124. See, e.g., PAIFRIiY & GASSER, supra note 116, at 141 (calling the campaign against peer-to-peer
downloaders a "disaster from the standpoint of public relations"); McBride & Smith, supra note 19 (reporting
that it "created a public-relations disaster for the industry, whose lawsuits targeted, among others, several single
mothers, a dead person and a 13-year-old girl"). One defendant told a Senate committee that "until the RIAA stops
targeting unwitting victims, I am not going to buy any more CDs and I know many consumers feel the same."
Privacy and Piracy: The Paradox of llegal File Sharing ont Peer-to-Peer Networks and the Impact of Technology
on the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Befire the Permanent Subconun. 01 Investigations oJ the S. Conun. on
GovertunentalAft~irs, 108th Cong. 51 (2003) (statement of Lorraine Sullivan).
125. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, RIAAs Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets: Single Mother in Calif:. 12-Year-Old
Girl in N. Y Among Defendants, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at El; Soni Sangha & Phyllis Furman, Sued for a
Song: N.YC. 12-yr-old Anong 261 Cited as Sharers, N.Y. DAt.Y Niws, Sept. 9. 2003; Jefferson Graham, RIAA
Lawsuits Bring Consternation, Chaos, USA TonAY (Sept. 10, 2003), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/
techpolicy/2003-09-10-riaa-suit-reax-x.htm. Graham's piece concluded by quoting a social psychology profes-
sor's assessment that "the image is out there of the bully ganging up on people with the least amount of money, the
rich taking from the poor." Id.
126. See, e.g., Yar, Rhetorics and Myths, supra note 2, at 617 (quoting musician Ignacio Escolar's comment:
"Like all musicians, I know that 100,000 pirate fans coming to my shows are more profitable than 10,000 original
ones"); Nate Anderson, Richard Marx (!) Attacks RIAA After $1.92M Thomas Verdict, ARs TECi-HNICA (Jun. 24,
2009, 7:29 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/richard-marx-attacks-riaa-after-1I9m-thomas-
verdict.ars; Ani DiFranco in Conversation, FORA.Tv, http://fora.tv/2008/04/09/AniDiFranco-inConversation
#AniDiFranco on. Illegal File-Sharing (last visited Feb. 3, 2014); Courtney Love, Love Manifesto, Rih/NOR.
Com, https://www.reznor.com/commentary/loves_manifestol.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
127. Order to Show Cause re First Amended Complaint, Elektra Entm't Grp. v. Brien, No. 2:06-cv-5289
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007).
128. Stanley Cohen observes a similar phenomenon at work in local police efforts to regulate British youth
culture in the 1960s: "The more sustained effects of police action . . . were to increase the deviance by unwittingly
solidifying the amorphous crowd forces into more viable groups for engaging in violence and by further
polarizing the deviants against the community." COHEN, supra note 36, at 142.
129. See, e.g., Motoko Rich, Print Books are Targets oj Pirates on the Web, N.Y. TiMits (May II, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/technology/intemet/12digital.html; To RIAA or Not to RIAA, That Was the
Question, THE AUTHOR's Gun.o (Feb. 5, 2010). http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/anicles/riaa.html.
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C. Federal Prosecution
In September 2009, twenty-two-year-old Richard Humphrey pleaded guilty
to one count of criminal copyright infringement for selling pirated movies prior
to their commercial release through an Internet website that he operated. He
offered paid subscription services, and also solicited donations for access to hun-
dreds of illegal copies of movies and software on his website. Humphrey was later
sentenced to twenty-nine months' imprisonment.13 0
Humphrey's punishment was possible only because federal prosecutors decided
that his conviction was worth the expenditure of government resources. Justice
Jackson once observed that "[tihe prosecutor has more control over life, liberty,
and reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous."' 3 1
In criminalizing an increasing swath of copyright infringement, Congress entrusts
the fate of hundreds of thousands of copyright infringers to that discretion. This is
the archetypical arrangement envisioned by Becker. Unlike in civil litigation, the
putative rule enforcers here are a professional class whose own judgment acts as a
check on that of the rule creators.
At the time of the NET Act's passage, both rightsholders and the public had
legitimate reason to have been troubled by this delegation of copyright enforce-
ment power to criminal prosecutors. From the standpoint of the rightsholders,
criminal enforcement comes with agency costs that predict lower levels of
prosecution. Assigning the task to less morally fervent enforcers tends to yield less
morally fervent enforcement.' 32 Consistent with that tendency, prosecutors shied
away from charging infringers under the NET Act. So while the rule creators
succeeded in securing harsher sanctions, those sanctions were not imposed in
every instance that they saw fit. This prompted several members of Congress to
urge the DOJ to make better use of the new prosecutorial tools that it had been
given. 133
From the standpoint of the public, the concern was not too little enforcement but
rather too much. At the time the legislation was passed, peer-to-peer copyright
infringement was widespread and, according to prevailing social norms, unobjec-
tionable. Because criminal law maximizes credibility when its rules track prevail-
ing social norms, many predicted that the new criminal laws were destined for
130. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Ohio Man Sentenced to 29 Months in Prison for Selling Pirated
Copies of Movies (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-447.html.
131. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOuMxY 3, 3 (1940).
132. See BliCKER, supra note 1, at 161; Adrian Vermeule, Conitra Nemo ludex in Sua Causa: The Limits of
Inqpartiality, 122 YAlIt L.J. 384, 411 (2012) (arguing that rules that assign decisionmaking authority to self-
interested or biased actors forego impartiality in return for greater institutional energy).
133. See Letter from Sen. Joseph Biden, Rep. Lamar Smith, and seventeen other members of Congress, to
John Ashcroft, Attorney General (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.politechbot.condocs/congress.
p2p.letter.081002.pdf.
2014] 379
380 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:359
backlash. 13 4 Widespread and well publicized civil lawsuits had shown little de-
terrent effect and may very well have fomented opposition to both the anti-piracy
message and its messenger. Expanding criminal enforcement seemed to flout the
ostensible lesson of this history.
Yet the expected backlash against the government never occurred. There has
been no significant opposition to criminal prosecutions of individual copyright
infringers, which have received supportive portrayals in the media.' 35 This is be-
cause federal prosecutors have exercised more selectivity in enforcing copyright
law than have rightsholders themselves. Of course, selectivity in itself is not sur-
prising; the government will necessarily have fewer resources and more respon-
sibilities than the private sector.' 36 But resource constraints alone cannot account
for the government's selective enforcement. Prosecutors are gravitating almost
exclusively toward a particular subset of infringers, a tiny fraction of what is likely
millions of culpable file-sharers.' 37 This subset comprises two groups: (1) commer-
cial pirates, i.e., those actually selling the infringing material, 138 and (2) "warez"
traders, sophisticated file-trading syndicates whose members compete to be the
first to upload an infringing work to the web, often before its commercial
release.' 3 9
Commercial piracy, which includes both online and brick-and-mortar sales,
poses a significant threat to rightsholders. For the film industry, predicted losses
from commercial piracy outpace those from illegal file-sharing by nearly a
134. See sources cited supra note 18. For a concise example of this argument, see Declan McCullagh,
Perspective: An End of an Era for File-Sharing Chic?, CNiTNiHWS (Aug. 25, 2003), http://news.cnet.com/End-of-
an-era-for-file-sharing-chic/2010-1071_3-5067473.html (predicting that the backlash to the RIAA lawsuits would
"'pale by comparison to what happens if the Justice Department uses the 1997 No Electronic Theft Act to
prosecute P2P users for criminal violations of copyright law").
135. For further analysis, see infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
136. See sources cited supra note 83.
137. One 2005 study estimated that 36 million file-sharers exist in the United States. Memorandum from Mary
Madden & Lee Rainie, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/
media/Files/Reports/2005/PIPFilesharingMarch05.pdf.pdf. The proportion of them that would qualify for
criminal liability may be quite large. Eric Goldman has noted that it would only require $5.56 worth of
infringement per day within a 180-day period to trigger criminal liability under the NET Act. Goldman, supra
note 17, at 430. With individual songs now priced at $1.29 on iTunes and movies at several dollars, this threshold
is easily reached. See also John Leland, Beyond File-Sharing; A Nation of Copiers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/14/style/beyond-file-sharing-a-nation-of-copiers.html.
138. For a representative sample of defendants, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, For-Profit Software
Piracy website Operator Sentenced to 87 Months in Prison (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/
criminal/cybercime/press-releases/2006/petersonSent.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Operator of
Massive For-Profit Software Piracy Website Sentenced to Six Years in Prison (Aug. 25, 2006), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2006/ferrerSent.htm; Press Release, U.S. Department
of Justice, Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to Criminal Infringement (Feb. 20, 2004), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2004/singhPlea.htm.
139. For a representative sample of defendants, see the DOJ collection of materials assembled on its recent
Operation Buccaneer. Operation Buccaneer, U.S. DIP'T OF JUSTICE, http://web.archive.org/web/20110722172136/
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ob/OBMain.htm (accessed through Internet Archive index).
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two-to-one margin.14 0 Surveys suggest that there remains a strong social norm
against engaging in piracy for profit.141 Anecdotal evidence is in accord. For
instance, media outlets traditionally critical of private lawsuits against file-
sharers have been far more supportive of prosecutions of commercial players.14 2
Larry Lessig's influential work on free culture simultaneously condemns for-profit
infringement and praises peer-to-peer distribution for personal use.' 4 3 Likewise,
Trotter Hardy has described commercial pirates as "by almost anyone's standards
'bad guys'-wrongdoers, shady characters, fly-by-night con men, and so on."'"
One would be hard pressed to find so harsh a description applied to non-
commercial file-sharers (except, perhaps, in the occasional rhetorical flourishes of
the rule creators themselves). Indeed, negative attitudes toward for-profit infringe-
ment can even be found among those individuals who think that copyrighted works
always ought to be free.14 5
A recent variation on the prosecution of commercial piracy is the currently
ongoing case against popular online storage locker Megaupload and its founder,
Kim Dotcom. Megaupload is a commercial site that allows users anonymously to
exchange copyrighted materials over the Internet, earning revenue from advertise-
ments and selling premium subscriptions.1 4 6 In January 2012, Dotcom, along with
several associates and the Megaupload corporate entity itself, was indicted in the
140. See Lucille M. Ponte, Coming Attractions: Opportunities and Challenges in Thwarting Global Movie
Piracy, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 331, 339 (2008) (comparing predicted U.S. losses of $864 million for commercial piracy
to $447 million for file-sharing).
141. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL. COPYRIGHT 117 (2001); Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate
Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1869, 1885 (2009); Palfrey et al., supra note 116, at 90
(describing focus group responses of young people who intuited that "it was within ethical boundaries to use
others' content--even without permission-in their own creations as long as they did not achieve financial gain
from their creations").
142. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, New Wave of Pirates Has Psoriasis, Frat Boy Hair; No Peglegs, ARS TECHNICA
(Oct. 12, 2009, 8:33 PM) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/10/who-are-commercial-software-pirates-
anyway.ars (commenting that commercial software piracy is "certainly fair game for the [Business Software
Alliance] and the government, and it definitely beats going after noncommercial college P2P users in federal
court").
143. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FRIE CUITURE 62-63 (2004) ("Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it ... . This is piracy plain and
simple. Nothing in the argument of this book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about the
subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point: This piracy is wrong.").
144. I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, II WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 305, 327 (2002).
145. See, e.g., enigmax, 'Bad' BitTorrent and Warez Sites Raided By Police, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 28, 2009),
http://torrentfreak.com/bad-bittorrent-and-warez-sites-raided-by-police-090428/ ("[R]emember folks; paying for
warez is like paying for oxygen, it's unnecessary and it gives decent pirates a bad name . . ."). The comments
below the post reveal a similar mindset: "[It's] only piracy if you make money off of it. It is not piracy in the
case you are just sharing files." Anonymous, Comment to id For a direct link to the comment, follow
http://torrentfreak.com/bad-bittorrent-and-warez-sites-raided-by-police-090428/#comment- 133658326.
146. See Ben Sisario, 7 Charged As FBI. Closes a Top File-Sharing Site, N.Y TIMEs (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/2 1/technology/megaupload-indictment-internet-piracy.htmi.
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largest criminal copyright case in history.147 Megaupload is just one of many sites
that offer this service, but to date, none of those other sites has been charged with a
crime.
It is not difficult to see how Megaupload was low hanging fruit for prosecutors.
Megaupload was by far the largest possible target, at one point ranking as the
thirteenth most frequently visited website in the world and accounting for 4% of all
Internet traffic.14 8 In 2010 alone, Dotcom earned $42 million in profit from the
enterprise.14 9 In order to make the site as attractive to users as it eventually
became, Dotcom allegedly paid users to upload as many copyrighted works as
possible. 50 User access to those works was the primary draw: 91% of users relied
on the site only for downloading others' files, not for their own storage. The
indictment cites numerous emails and texts among Megaupload employees that
acknowledged the piracy that was central to their business model.' 5 ' As one
popular technology blog noted at the time of the indictment, "Megaupload wasn't
just big; it was brazen." 52 On top of all this, Dotcom is not likely a candidate for
popular sympathy. He has previously been convicted of insider trading and
embezzlement, was living in a $24 million estate at the time of his arrest, and lives
a notoriously flamboyant lifestyle.' 5 3 Among his possessions are twenty-five
automobiles, three of which have vanity license plates reading "GUILTY,"
"EVIL," and "GOD."' 5 4
To be sure, the Megaupload case raises some novel legal issues that complicate
the prosecution.' 5 5 Nevertheless, regardless of how a court may rule on those
questions of law, the defendants look culpable.' 56 A jury would not likely
147. See Indictment, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-CR-3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012). A superseding
indictment added additional counts of copyright infringement and wire fraud. See Superseding Indictment, United
States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-CR-3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 2012).
148. Superseding Indictment, supra note 147, at 2-3.
149. Id. at 14.
I50. Id. at 28.
151. Id. at 34-60.
152. See Sam Biddle, Why Did the Feds Target Megaupload? And Why Now?, Gi.Mono (Jan. 20, 2012
12:00 PM), htp://giznodo.con5877836/why-did-the-feds-choose-megaupload-and-why-now.
153. Roger Parloff, Megaupload and the Twilight of Copyright, CNNMoNIY (Jul. 11, 2012, 5:00 AM),
hup://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/07/1Il/megaupload-cyberlocker-copyright/.
154. Id.
155. To begin with, complex jurisdictional and extraterritoriality questions remain regarding how the U.S.
criminal copyright provisions will apply to Dotcom, a resident of New Zealand, and Megaupload Ltd., a Hong
Kong company. See United States v. Dotcom, No. 1: 12-CR-3, 2012 WL 4788433 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2012); Alison
Frankel, Megaupload, Meet Morrison, Ri;UTIERs (Jan. 24, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.comi/alison-frankel/2012/01 /
24/megaupload-meet-morrison/. On top of this, no court has yet embraced the theory that secondary infringe-
ment, a clearly established but judge-made doctrine in civil cases, suffices for criminal liability. See Jennifer
Granick, Megaupload: A Lot Less Guilty Than You Think. CTR. FOR INTIERN7r & Sc'y (Jan. 26,2012, 11:47 AM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/6795; cy Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005) (describing secondary infringement principles in a civil context).
156. See Timothy B. Lee, Is Megaupload "A Lot Less Guilty Than You Think?", ARs TI:CHNICA (Feb. 16,2012,
1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/02/is-megaupload-a-lot-less-guilty-than-you-think/ ("In theory,
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experience much cognitive dissonance if asked to believe that Dotcom is a
criminal. As a target of enforcing the rule that copyright infringement is wrong,
Megaupload is an unextraordinary choice.
Unlike commercial pirates, warez traders shun profiteering from piracy-they
infringe more for the sport of it.' 57 And while they share this non-commerciality
with peer-to-peer downloaders, the similarities end there. Warez traders operate
in stealthy, hierarchical networks "similar to inner-city gang members, minus the
violence."' 5 8 Their goal is simple: to beat the release date of a big-name album,
videogame, or movie by as much time as possible.'" 9 In order to do so, they rely on
sophisticated tactics that would be unfamiliar to the casual, armchair file-sharer-
IP address encryption, continuously rotating usernames and passwords, and pseu-
donymous titles. It is, by all accounts, a "darknet," a region of cyberspace hidden
from view to the majority of its users.160 These industrial-scale infringers are fully
aware of the criminality of their actions and, as a result, pour considerable
resources into maintaining secrecy.'"'
The two defendants in United States v. Slater are typical of those targeted in
warez prosecutions.' 62 They were members of a group called "Pirates with
Attitude," which operated thirteen FTP servers with the professed goal of making
as much copyrighted software freely available as possible.' 63 To accomplish this
mission, the group worked in what the court described as "assembly line-like
fashion": suppliers, who had special access to the software files, provided the files
to crackers; crackers removed the internal copy protections from the software code
and passed them on to packagers; packagers tested the software, added descriptive
information, and delivered the files to couriers; and the couriers finally uploaded
the finished products to members-only websites maintained by the group, where
they were available for download and onward distribution.'6
The enterprise was shut down when FBI agents seized a server that fed the
they should be interpreting this carefully, but the defendants look really guilty .... [Tihey look like they are
running a criminal enterprise.").
157. See Stephen Granade, Warez, Abandonware, and the Software Industry, BRAss LANTERN, http:/Ibrass
lantem.org/community/companies/warez.htmil (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
158. Timothy L. O'Brien, King Kong v's. the Pirates of the Multiplex, N.Y. TIMis (Aug. 28,2005), http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/08/28/business/media/28movie.html.
159. See Jeff Howe, The Shadow Internet, WIRin (Jan. 2005), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.01/
topsite.html.
160. Id.
161. See Michael M. DuBose, Criminal Enfi)rcemnent of Intellectual Property Laws in the Twenty-First
Century, 29 Col.uM. J.L. & ARTs 481, 492 (2006) (providing prosecutor's first-hand accounts from proffer
sessions); see also Jim Wagner, The Hunt for Warez, INTERNIiTNiws.com (Apr. 19, 2002), http://www.internet
news.com/dev-news/print.php/10792_1012961 2 (quoting warez trader's statement that people enjoy the activity
for "the hint of doing something illegal").
162. See 348 F3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
163. Id. at 667; Goldman, supra note 17, at 384.
164. Slater, 348 F.3d at 667.
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group's central website.16 5 The server contained 5,000 different downloadable
programs. 166 Over the two-year period charged in the indictment, group members
had uploaded to the website more than 34,000 different programs, including
popular applications from Microsoft, Adobe, Norton, IBM, and Oracle.16 7 The
two Slater defendants were among seventeen that were indicted for conspiracy
to commit copyright infringement.' 6 8 Twelve were members of Pirates with
Attitude, each of whom operated under a pseudonym.'6 9 The other five had
provided hardware in exchange for access to the group's warez library.'7 0 Except
for two that remain fugitives, all defendants were convicted.' 7 '
These defendants, like the Megaupload defendants, don't look much like
everyday infringers. The hierarchy, secrecy, sophistication, and mass-scale of their
operation set them apart. Like most warez traders, the defendants are targets that
members of the public can recognize as blameworthy without having to blame
themselves.17 2
Together, commercial pirates and warez traders form the focus of criminal
copyright enforcement in the United States.'7 3 But it did not have to be this way.
Indeed, senior DOJ officials promised otherwise. In 2002, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General John Malcolm told an audience at a technology summit that
"[m]ost parents would be horrified if they walked into a child's room and found
100 stolen CDs . . . However, these same parents think nothing of having their
children spend time online downloading hundreds of songs without paying a
dime." 74 To rectify matters, Malcolm continued, the federal government would
need to educate parent and child alike through criminal prosecution. "There does
have to be some kind of a public message that stealing is stealing is stealing." 7 5
Malcolm would repeat this pledge before a congressional committee, stating:
With respect to those people who use peer-to-peer networks or, for that matter,
any other mechanism to engage in copyright infringement, we will prosecute
165. Id.; Goldman, supra note 17, at 385.
166. Slater, 348 F.3d at 667.
167. Id. at 668; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Leader of Software Piracy Ring Sentenced to 18 Months
in Prison (May 15, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2002/
rothbergSent-pirates.htm.
168. Goldman, supra note 17, at 385. For additional background on the investigation and indictment, see
United States v. Rothberg, No. 00-CR-85, 2002 WL 171963 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2002).
169. Goldman, supra note 17, at 384 n.99.
170. Id. at 385.
171. Id. at 386.
172. See Eric Goldman, Warez Trading and Criminal Copyright Infringement, 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A.
395, 426 (2004) (describing how "[u]nsympathetic warez traders" provide cases "that permit average Americans
to distinguish the criminal's conduct from their own").
173. See Eric Goldman, The Challenges of Regulating Warez Trading, 23 Soc. SC. COMPUTIER Ruiv. 24, 27
(2005) [hereinafter Goldman, Challenges]; Goldman, supra note 17, at 392.
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them. We can prosecute them under the criminal copyright laws, which
generally carry up to 5 years. Felonies, we can prosecute them under the [NET
act], which is a 3-year felony.176
Those prosecutions never happened. Though there was a change in the number
of charges brought, there was no change in type. As the graph below shows, in the
decade since the passage of the NET Act, the number of prosecutions for criminal
copyright infringement increased from seventeen in 1998 to its highpoint of 110 in
2007.177 The percentage of investigations that lead to prosecutions has also
increased, rising from 29% in 1998 to 73% in 2009. But none of these cases has
involved the sort of peer-to-peer downloading activity that the rule creators
envisioned when they lobbied for passage of the NET Act.'7 8
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DInvestigative Matters Received by U.S. Attorneys OCases Filed
Figure 1. Data: Office of the Attorney General, Annual Performance and
Accountability Reports' 79
176. International Copyright Piracy: A Growing Problem with Links to Organized Crime and Terrorism:
Hearing Before Subcomn. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 103 (2003) (statement of John Malcolm), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju85643.000/hju85643_0f.htm.
177. The total number of criminal cases in the federal court system in 2006 was 66,860. JAMES C. DUn,; 2006
JUDICIAL. BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs 15 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/front/completejudicialbusiness.pdf
178. See ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAw 200 (3d ed. 2012) ("[T]he federal government has not brought
any criminal prosecutions against individuals for using the Internet to obtain copyrighted materials without
permission for their personal use.").
179. The reports can be found at http://www.justice.gov/about/bpp.htm.
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There is an acoustic separation between prosecutors' public statements and their
enforcement activities. The DOJ has proudly asserted the upward numerical trend
in prosecutions as evidence of its redoubled commitment to punishing copyright
violations. 8 0 Moreover, its press releases regularly refer to warez traders as
peer-to-peer pirates, an ambiguous title that could also be applied to garden-variety
downloaders.'"' The message that prosecutors are sending with their words may
be the same as the one that the copyright industries have been trying to send all
along: infringers, even casual ones, are thieves. But the message they have been
sending through their actions has been subtler. A 2001 manual for prosecutors of
intellectual property crime specifically cautions against pursuing copyright in-
fringers who are "young . . . , have no criminal record, or otherwise [are] sympa-
thetic to a jury."' 8 2 It further instructs prosecutors to focus on egregious violators
rather than those "merely engaged in technical violations of the law."' 8 3 The
profile of federal copyright piracy defendants is the proof that the enforcers are
listening. At no point have they gone the way of the RIAA-the way that John
Malcolm promised they would go-and prosecuted individual peer-to-peer users.
IV. A SEPARATED POWERS OF MORAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Montesquieu wrote that the union of legislative and executive powers within
the same institution creates a high likelihood that "tyrannical laws" will be
enforced in a "tyrannical manner." 8 4 The U.S. Constitution's solution to this
problem, famously advocated in The Federalist No. 47,'8 was to assign these
different powers to different institutions.8' As a result of these assignments, the
180. See, e.g, NATIoNAL INTEllECU.L PROriRTY LAw ENORCEIMENT COORDINATION COUNCIL, Rt:EPOr To
THE PRESIDNT AND CONCRss ON CooRDINATION O INTEILL-IeAL. PROrPERTY ENORCEIMENT AND PROTECTION
33 (2008), available at http://2001-2009.connerce.gov/s/groups/public/@doc/@os/@opa/documents/content/
prodOL005189.pdf; U.S. DEIARTMENT OP JUSTICE, PR(KiRiSS RIilolf1 OP THE DiARTMIENT OP JusTICi's TASK
FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROiRTY 24-25 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-
releases/2006/20061PTFProgressReport%286-19-06%29.pdf.
181. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Federal Jury Convicts High Ranking Web Site Administrator in
Peer-to-Peer Piracy Crackdown (Jun. 27, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-
574.htmi (referring to the conviction of a pre-release warez site administrator as the "first criminal conviction
after jury trial for P2P copyright infringement").
182. CoMPUTER CRIMEi & INTIlEIiCTUAL PRom'wrrY SECTIoN, U.S. Dit'T or JUSTIcE, PRosICUTING INTil.I.F;C-
TUAI.PROPi IffYCRIMiS MANUAL § IllI.E.4 (2001) [hereinafter IPCRIMPS MANUAl.]. The most recent edition of the
manual has removed this provision, but the same language is still present in a memo to U.S. Attorneys made
available on the DOJ's cybercrime website. See David Goldstone & Michael O'Leary, Novel Criminal Copyright
Issues Related to the Internet, U.S. ATroRNEYs' Bu.i., May 2001, at 36, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
eousa/foia-reading-room/usab4903.pdf.
183. IPCRIMIS MANUAL, supra note 182, § Ill.E.4.
184. 1 BARON lDE MONTESQUlIU, THi SPIRIToi LAws bk. XI (1748).
185. THn FEDIERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
186. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."); id. art. 1, § I (vesting the legislative power in
Congress): id. art. 11, § I (vesting the executive power in the President); id. art. Ill, § I (vesting the judicial power
in the Supreme Court and any inferior courts established by Congress).
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executive branch can veto a bill, nominate and remove its officers from congressio-
nally created positions, and, most significantly here, exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion in determining how to enforce the law.18 7
In this Part, I argue that successful moral entrepreneurship efforts are marked
by a similar institutional design: the separation of powers between those who
create rules and those who apply them to rulebreakers. I draw this argument,
whose theory I introduce in Section A, primarily from a side-by-side comparison
of the civil and criminal enforcement efforts of copyright law. Section B presents
this comparison along with a brief discussion of other corroboratory historical
examples. In Section C, I discuss factors that may prevent this institutional design
from yielding the benefits that I have posited.
A. The Theory
Cass Sunstein once observed that "[i]f Nancy Reagan tells teenagers to 'just say
no' to drugs, many teenagers may think that it is very good to say 'yes.'" 8 8
Guarding against potential backlash ought to be of significant concern in the
institutional design of moral entrepreneurship. One can find examples of self-
defeating moral entrepreneurship efforts in the regulation of such diverse areas as
domestic violence,'18  gun possession in inner-city public schools,' 90 tax eva-
sion,' 9 ' lying to the government,' 9 2 and date rape.' 93 In each area, moral crusaders
intended to change the consensus view yet instead reinforced it.
Dan Kahan's theory of "gentle nudges" offers aspiring moral entrepreneurs a
prescription for avoiding this fate: favor laws that condemn conduct only slightly,
but not substantially, more severely than do the social norms that the laws seek
to change.19 4 When the law's notion of deviance races out too far ahead of the
typical decisionmaker's, in what Kahan calls a "hard shove," that decisionmaker is
more likely to balk at enforcing the law. And the reluctance of one decisionmaker
strengthens the resistance of other decisionmakers, creating a "self-reinforcing
187. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Col.um. L. Rilv. 673, 725 (1997)
("Every statute confers some degree of discretion on those who implement it. No legislator, however prescient,
can predict all the twists and turns that lie ahead for his or her handiwork."). This observation applies equally to
criminal and civil enforcement by the executive branch. See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980)
(asserting that the U.S. legal system has given wide discretion to criminal prosecutors).
188. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 919.
189. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 37, at 628-3 1; Zorza, supra note 89, at 65 (asserting that harsh
domestic violence laws deter prosecution and enforcement).
190. Kahan, Social lifluence, supra note 25, at 363-64.
191. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
192. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power and Social Meaning, 97 CAL. L. R~v. 1515,
1553-55 (2009) (claiming that prosecuting harmless lies does not deter more harmful lies).
193. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 37, at 623-25 (asserting that harsher rape laws leads to decrease in
enforcement).
194. See generally id. (asserting that severe laws undercut efforts to change social norms).
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wave of resistance."' On the other hand, when the law condemns only slightly
more than does that typical decisionmaker, what Kahan calls a "gentle nudge," she
is more willing to discharge her duty and enforce the law. And willingness, like
unwillingness, is contagious. Just as the hard shove generates a wave of resistance,
the gentle nudge generates an equal but opposite "wave of condemnation."' 96
Small condemnatory increments over a long period of time can thus achieve
normative change that large condemnatory increments over a short period of time
cannot.
My argument in favor of separating moral entrepreneurship powers builds on
Kahan's thesis by identifying the kinds of enforcers who are most likely to opt for
gentle nudges. The more distance between rule creators and enforcers, the less
likely the rule enforcers will foment backlash. Rule creators therefore ought to
prefer rule enforcers whose normative sensibilities align more closely with those
of the general population than with the rule creators themselves.
It might be argued that non-enforcement inevitably contributes to permissive
social norms. If a prosecutor knows that ajury is likely to nullify or otherwise find
an excuse to acquit, he is unlikely to charge the crime in the first place. Never
charging a crime perpetuates the public perception that the criminalized conduct is
not morally wrong, which in turn further disincentivizes the prosecutor from
pursuing the charge.19 7 In this setup, the prosecutor is part of the feedback loop of
opposition to the rule creator's desired norm. By electing not to charge the crime,
he fuels backlash to the rule creator's desired norm.
But there is another way of looking at the prosecutor's contribution: by electing
not to charge the crime, he in fact contains backlash. Foregoing prosecution avoids
nullification or convictions that could rally public protest. Bullishly forging ahead
with the prosecution presents Kahan's archetypical hard shove, only this time on
the side of rule enforcement rather than rule creation. As Robinson and Darley
have documented, an enforcer's hard shove subjects that enforcer to a loss of moral
credibility.'9 8 Thus, where the law condemns those whom society is not prepared
to condemn, the moral entrepreneurship effort is better off if the enforcer holds
rather than plays the hand that the rule creators and legislature have dealt him. The
cautious prosecutor may not expand the borders of deviance, but at least he may
prevent them from receding.
This is not to say, however, that prosecutors simply preserve a normative ceil-
ing beyond which a rule can never be expanded. By avoiding further backlash,
prosecutors preserve a foothold from which other moral entrepreneurs may
attempt other, less drastic means (Kahan's gentle nudges again) of generating a
195. Id. at 608.
196. Id.
197. For examples, see id. at 623-25 (date rape); id. at 628-31 (domestic violence); id. at 632 (Prohibition);
id. at 633-34 (drunk driving prior to the 1980s).
198. See supra note 33 and cited sources.
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more robust rule than that which society currently embraces.' 99 The desired
attitudinal change may yet be attainable through the right forms of moral
entrepreneurship, but a self-defeating enforcement effort leaves society even less
receptive to that change than it was to begin with. Self-defeat, in short, creates
more work for subsequent enforcers. This means that averting self-defeat does
more than freeze a norm in an existing state; it also makes the eventual task of
expanding that norm less Sisyphean.
What allows this productive non-action to occur is an institutional separation
between rule enforcer and rule creator. Professional enforcers lack the rule
creators' "naive moral fervor,"200 which allows them to forbear enforcement in
situations where the rule creator, if given the opportunity, would forge ahead.
Because Becker assumed that the enforcer would be a public prosecutor, he
described rather than prescribed a separation of powers. 2 0 ' But once one considers
the alternative-a rule creator who doubles as rule enforcer--one can better
appreciate that separation as a strategic bulwark against backlash. A rule creator
who enforces her own rule risks cannibalizing the favorable norms upon which she
had intended to build. A rule creator who commits to let an outside enforcer decide,
by contrast, averts that risk. As a result, where social norms are in flux, the agency
cost of delegating enforcement to others is actually a benefit.
Professional enforcers can provide this benefit without even being aware of it.
Delegating rule enforcement is successful not because the delegates are necessar-
ily superior strategists, but because they face different institutional pressures. Pros-
ecutors tend to choose targets whose punishment would please the public and, par-
ticularly in the case of federal enforcement, enhance the prosecutor's reputation.20 2
That set of preferences gives prosecutors an incentive to pass over offenders who
appear blameless. Thus, whether or not professional enforcers consciously play the
long game on promoting compliance with a moral rule, their enforcement priorities
will be less vulnerable to backlash than those of the rule creators.
Admittedly, there is an inherent challenge to applying this framework in
practice. It will always be easier to identify existing backlash than to anticipate
backlash before it occurs. This uncertainty might lead the risk averse to avoid
enforcement altogether. That, however, would be a poor moral entrepreneurship
strategy. In the face of adverse social norms, not every decision to forego
enforcement action will necessarily be a boon to moral entrepreneurs. Perhaps
non-action will indeed help rule creators by preserving space for more effective
199. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 37, at 609 (describing the process in which gentle nudges can
"initiate a process that culminates in the near eradication of the contested norm and the associated types of
behavior").
200. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (asserting the rule enforcer as more detached from the content
of the rule compared to the rule creator).
201. BlCKlR, supra note 1, at 155-56.
202. Stuntz, supra note 72, at 533, 543.
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measures to develop; then again, perhaps it will hurt them by publicly signaling
normative disinterest in the rule.2 03 The primary difficulty is in correctly distinguish-
ing between productive and counterproductive non-action.
Adhering to two guiding principles may help ameliorate this difficulty. First,
moral entrepreneurship cannot survive in an enforcement vacuum. Even where
aggressive enforcement is prudently withheld, less aggressive enforcement must
still step into the breach. So, for example, rule enforcers can limit serious sanctions
to those well within societal margins of deviance. Targeting core offenders is a
good way to avoid projecting apathy that feeds the development of permissive
norms. Second, because backlash is less likely to greet bark than bite, rule
enforcers can use rhetoric that covers a wider class of conduct than that covered by
their legal actions. This acoustic separation between word and action harnesses the
popular appeal of easy cases to build support for the hard cases.20
B. Theory Applied
The moral crusade over copyright infringement, which involves both para-
digms of rule enforcement, is evidence of the tactical benefit of separating moral
entrepreneurship powers. As described in Part III, while federal prosecutors have
vocally supported the same broad rule that the rule creators convinced Congress to
legislate, they have selectively implemented it. The selectivity is working. By
targeting defendants whose activities are entirely alien to the experience of most
file-sharers, prosecutors have incurred no significant public backlash. The average
Internet user has never heard of warez traders, even though they are the ones who
usually provide the original "Adam and Eve" file that eventually spawns the
thousands of copies floating around the web. And those who have heard of warez
can readily distinguish their own downloading from leaking pre-release material to
the world on an industrial scale.2 05 One recent study found that high school-age
file-sharers tend to draw a normative line between themselves and the seeders,
whether warez groups or commercial pirates, who make pirated content available
for the first time.- Similarly, mainstream media coverage of convictions has not
challenged the law's legitimacy as it had during the RIAA campaign, despite the
potential for prison sentences. Instead, it has portrayed the enforcement as a
necessary response to the activity of surreptitious outlaws. 2 0 7
203. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (arguing that enforcers' unwillingness to charge individuals
signals that the crime is not morally wrong, which further increases prosecutors' unwillingness).
204. For the canonical statement that the law may use one set of rules to prescribe individuals' conduct and a
different set of rules to govern how public officials should treat that conduct, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules
and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. Rriv. 625 (1984).
205. See Goldman, Ciallenges, supra note 173, at 26 (noting the difference between peer-to-peer file trading
and downloading rare files such as prerelease movies).
206. Palfrey et al., supra note 116, at 86.
207. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 158; Moving Against Movie Piracy, supra note 56 (describing downloaders
as stealing revenue from the movie industry).
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By selectively focusing on core violators, prosecutors have diluted a broad
prohibition down to something that aligns better with existing popular sentiment.
Commercial pirates and warez traders are sufficiently removed from the day-to-
day activities of most Americans that prosecutors have effectively drawn a line
around them as deviants. Whether this prosecutorial discretion is actually deterring
these actors is still debated, 2 08 but it at least circumscribes them, preventing
American citizens from embracing them the way they have embraced the file-
swappers next door.
Moreover, by avoiding further backlash, prosecutors have preserved others'
capacity to propagate a stronger norm against infringement. For instance, under
a White House-brokered partnership between the creative content industries
and Internet service providers, Internet service providers are beginning to imple-
ment "mitigation measures" to discourage infringement without enforcing an
unqualified prohibition. 2 09 These include email alerts, educational messages, and,
after repeat infractions, reduction in Internet speed and redirection to a landing
page discussing the effects of copyright infringement. Whether this strategy will
strengthen norms against infringement remains to be seen. But had prosecutors
enforced the NET Act as stringently as rightsholders intended, the mitigation
measures experiment would likely have confronted an even more permissive norm
regarding infringement.
This theory of separated powers may also help to explain the success of other
moral entrepreneurship efforts beyond the copyright sphere. The remainder of this
Part briefly discusses three representative examples: smoking, drunk driving, and
underage drinking.
1. Smoking
Smoking in the United States today is marginalized as a self-destructive
vice. 2 '0 Fifty years ago, however, smoking in the United States was accepted as a
mark of sophistication.2 1 1 Between then and now, many state and local govern-
ments passed laws that prohibit smoking in public places and use of tobacco by
minors.2 12 Yet enforcement of these prohibitions does not appear to have driven
the change in the social meaning of smoking. On the contrary, it was likely aided
by non-enforcement. Enforcers have exhibited disinterest in administering these
208. See Miriam Bitton, Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement's Criminal Copyright Enfore-
ment Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOI.KiY 67, 90-91 (2012) (citing studies that show that piracy is still
common, and possibly has increased since the passage of the NET Act). See generally Goldman, supra note 17.
209. Dara Kerr, 'Copyright Alert System' Rolls Out to Catch Illegal Downloaders, CNET (Feb. 25, 2013,
5:36 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009-3-57571237-83/copyright-alert-system-rolls-out-to-catch-illegal-
downloaders. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: "Six Strikes" Measured
Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INrM.I.. PROl MEInlA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2012).
210. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 37, at 625-28.
211. Id.
212. PETER D. JACOBSON & JiilIRIY WASSERMAN, ToBACCO CONTRO. LAws 10-15 (1997).
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prohibitions due to both resource constraints and their own normative apathy
over the moral rule.213 This weak enforcement level has sidestepped the pre-
sumptive tobacco industry-driven backlash that would have generated sympathy
for smokers and antipathy toward government heavy-handedness. As one study
found based on qualitative survey data from a number of states and municipalities,
If the tobacco industry's fabricated image of a brown-shirted "smoking police
force" were in some sense to bear resemblance to reality, then we could
reasonably expect them to redouble their efforts at the state level either to enact
legislation overturning or seriously weakening the statewide law or to pass a
law that preempts local ordinances. As one of our respondents summed up this
point of view, "If you get greedy, you'll lose."214
Enforcers' refusal to impose formal legal sanctions on violators has left room for
communities to develop informal social sanctions as a more successful alternative.
Enacting mild "zoning" restrictions on smoking gave nonsmokers a legal footing
on which to express moral condemnation of their smoking peers. 215 This informal
condemnation, rather than legal punishment, has proven to be the engine of rule
enforcement. 2 16 Police inaction has thus helped the long-term incubation of an
anti-smoking norm.
2. Drunk Driving
Before the formation of advocacy groups such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving in the 1980s, police and prosecutors regularly refused to enforce drunk
driving prohibitions. Until that time, driving under the influence was treated as a
traffic offense rather than the moral wrong that Americans have increasingly come
to define it as in recent years.2 17 Then advocacy groups altered the narrative
through stigmatizing educational campaigns.2 18 Informal sanctions provided the
missing ingredient that allowed formal sanctions to succeed.
The initial refusal of actors within the criminal justice system to enforce laws
213. See id at 127-28 (describing police officers' reluctance to enforce a youth access ordinance that they
believed to be overly punitive); id. at 129 (quoting one survey respondent's statement that "[i]t is difficult to
imagine that one of our local police officers is going to spend an afternoon in the bushes waiting to bust some kids
for smoking cigarettes"); id. at 131 (quoting another survey respondent's statement that "[s]moking is not
handguns," making it "often difficult to mobilize people to action").
214. Id. at 77; see also id. at 108 (stating that proponents of tobacco control have a tough time enforcing the
existing laws in the face of tobacco industry influence).
215. See id. at 81 (finding that "the enactment of tobacco control laws helps shift the balance of power in favor
of nonsmokers, which may lead them to speak out in instances where they believe the laws are being violated");
Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 37, at 627-28 ("[E]ven individuals who might not otherwise have found
exposure to smoke unpleasant were more likely to object to public smoking, which against the background of
public smoking bans began to express contemptuous disregard for the interests of nonsmokers.").
216. JACOnSON & WASSERMAN, supra note 212, at 49 (noting high level of voluntary compliance with clean
indoor air laws, obviating the need for enforcing legal prohibitions).
217. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 37, at 633.
218. Id. at 634.
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against drunk driving could be seen as a failure in moral entrepreneurship. But
in the long run it may be more accurate to call it a success. Had these actors
maintained a vigorous enforcement strategy before social norms were ready to
bear it, they may well have triggered a backlash that hardened attitudes condoning
drunk driving. Instead, their non-action left those norms alone until the arrival of
private actors savvy enough to use softer enforcement mechanisms.
3. Underage Drinking
If enforced literally, the national minimum drinking age would require scores of
arrests of young people. Notwithstanding legal prohibitions, underage drinking is
commonplace and relatively unstigmatized among youth in many communities,
particularly on college campuses.2 19 In an effort to change these permissive norms,
some college administrators have elected to forego strong-arm tactics in favor of
information campaigns. These campaigns inform undergraduates that fewer of
their underage peers are drinking than they probably suspect. 220 This so-called
"social norms approach," which redefines students' sense of what normative
conformity requires, has proven successful at reducing binge drinking on a number
of campuses. 2 2 1 The enforcers who have gone this route have avoided the backlash
that typically results from the literal enforcement policy preferred by crusaders for
these prohibitions.22 2 This allows them to maintain moral credibility to enforce a
core norm against excessive drinking even as they permit less egregious infrac-
tions to go unpunished.
Margaret Raymond recounts a similar phenomenon at work in the enforcement
of a public intoxication statute in a university town where public intoxication is
219. See John R. Knight et al., Alcohol Abuse and Dependence Among U.S. College Students, 63 J. STUD. ON
AL coHoL 263, 263-69 (2002) (observing high levels of alcohol abuse among college students); Andrew
Stuttaford, De-Demonizing Rum: Whats Wrong with 'Underage' Drinking?, NAT'L. REv., June 25, 2001, at 32
(describing the lack of respect for the minimum drinking age); Teenagers Favor Curbs, But Drinking Remains
Rife, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/06/us/teenagers-favor-curbs-but-drinking-
remains-rife.html (referencing al999 survey that found that half of all high school students had consumed alcohol
within the past month); Henry Wechsler et al., Underage College Students'Drinking Behavior, Access to Alcohol,
and the Influence ofDeterrence Policies, 50 J. AM. C. HEALTH 223, 233 (2002) ("Despite the national prohibition
on alcohol use by people under the age of 21 years, significant numbers of college students in the United States
drink and drink heavily.").
220. Jeffrey Kluger, How to Manage Teen Drinking (The Smart Way), TIME (June 18, 2001), http://content.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1000115,00.html.
221. Id.; MICHAEL P. HAINES, A SOCIAL NORMS APPROACH TO PREVENTING BINGE DRINKING AT COLLEGES AND
UNIvIRsITIEs 4 (1996) (reporting that, after traditional alcohol abuse interventions had failed, a social norms
campaign on campus led to a thirty-five percent reduction in binge drinking).
222. See Steve Kolowich, Crackdown on Campus Drinking Draws Backlash, USA TODAY (Apr. 13, 2010,
2:15 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-04-13-IHE-crackdown-campus-drinking-UW-
Stout l3_STN.htm; see also LINDA C. LEDERMAN ET AL., CHANGING THE CULTURE OF COLLEGE DRINKING: THE
STUnENT VOICEs PROJECT 21-22 (2005), available at http://humancommunication.clas.asu.edulfiles/SVPproject
final.pdf (presenting focus group study that found that zero-tolerance policies on campus perversely encouraged
more drinking).
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normatively permissible.m While the legislated prohibition covers all public
intoxication, police only arrest core violators: those whose alcohol consumption
leads to health risks, disorderliness, or belligerence.22 4 When students perceived
that they had been targeted for "mere" public drunkenness-in other words, the
very conduct proscribed by the moral rule-they protested.2 25 For this prohibition,
as for the prohibition on underage drinking, selective punishment of core violators
preserves a narrow norm that would be lost by broad punishment of all violators.2
C. Some Limitations
Although assigning rule creation and rule enforcement to different personnel
increases the likelihood of a separation of entrepreneurial agendas, it does not
guarantee it. Under certain circumstances, the professional rule enforcer will tend
to apply a normatively unpopular prohibition as strictly as the rule creator would
have. In these instances, the separation of moral entrepreneurship powers will not
reduce backlash. This Section lists some common examples.
1. Enforcement of Norms that Affect the Enforcers' Institutional Authority
Rule enforcers are more likely to internalize norms that they perceive to
affect their professional prerogatives directly. Enforcing these norms is not simply
the fulfillment of a duty to ensure compliance, but also a defense of enforcers'
institutional authority. In such scenarios, the content of the moral rule matters
greatly. The rule enforcer is his own rule creator.
One example of this phenomenon at work can be found in the federal govern-
ment's enforcement of a norm against lying to law enforcement agents. Federal
law prohibits making a "materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation" to a federal official.22 7 The government frequently prosecutes
cases of defensive false statements that arise solely as a result of interviews with
government agents.228 Defendants in these cases are typically punished for nothing
more than an exculpatory "no" in response to government questioning regarding
an underlying prohibited act. Prosecutors charge these cases, notwithstanding
the absence of a social norm condemning the defendants' behavior, in part because
they present a "symbolic assertion of government power, or of government
entitlement to information as property."22 9 Yet the urge to assert government
223. Raymond, supra note 84, at 1411-12.
224. See Heather Woodward, Harsh Arrest Trends Lead to Crowded Juil, IowA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN, Oct. 22,
2000, at I A, 4A.
225. Raymond, supra note 84, at 1412 & n.77.
226. For an example of a self-defeating pursuit of a strict public intoxication enforcement policy, see
Lnwmakers to Review Bar Busts, DAj.AS MoRNING NIws (Mar. 25, 2006 12:00 AM), http://www.myplainview.com/
article_2fcb2dd9-006d-50d6-949f-df9dd8efb2 I d.html.
227. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
228. Griffin, supra note 192, at 1516.
229. Id. at 1536.
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authority has led to an overreaching that has failed to stigmatize the prosecuted
conduct and may be contributing to a loss of moral credibility.2 30
Such overreaching more likely occurs where the enforcer recognizes an institu-
tional stake in the breadth of the moral rule being enforced. In these cases, the
enforcer is not applying someone else's moral rule, but rather one of his own
design. 3' Just as the history of civil copyright infringement teaches that a rule
creator may become her own rule enforcer, so the history of false statement
prosecutions teaches that a rule enforcer may become her own rule creator.2 In
either case, the conflation of the two powers of moral entrepreneurship leads to
enforcement decisions more susceptible to backlash.
A similar example may be found in the prosecution of civil disobedience.
Targeting those who violate the law on ideological grounds enforces not only the
substantive norm underlying the particular violated law, but also the general norm
for fidelity to the rule of law.23 3 While rule enforcers have an institutional interest
in promoting a rule-of-law norm, cultivating that norm may generate opposition if
the conduct underlying the civil disobedience is perceived to be innocuous. Take,
for instance, the recent prosecution of Internet activist Aaron Swartz. Swartz
allegedly downloaded nearly five million documents from JSTOR, a proprietary
repository of academic journal articles, after executing a computer program that
circumvented various protection measures meant to prevent bulk downloading.234
By the time of his indictment in 2011, he had earned notoriety as an advocate for
"liberating" information kept within such password-protected databases. In 2008,
he published an essay entitled "Guerilla Open Access Manifesto" in which he
proclaimed that, in the "grand tradition of civil disobedience," the time had come
to "declare our opposition to this private theft of public culture. We need to take
information, wherever it is stored, make our copies and share them with the
world . . . . We need to download scientific journals and upload them to file sharing
networks."23 The same year, Swartz developed a computer script designed to
download every document from PACER, the federal judiciary's electronic storing
230. Id. at 1547-54. Griffin notes that Martha Stewart's brand has endured her conviction, President Clinton
survived impeachment with high approval ratings, and baseball fans have displayed little interest in the false
statement prosecutions of former stars who denied steroid use. See id at 1526-28.
231. See id. at 1538 (arguing that "exculpatory no" prosecutions function as process offenses for disobeying
investigators); Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 Go. L.J. 1435,
1449-52 (2009) (describing a class of "obstinacy" offenses that punish affronts to state authority).
232. See generally Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (finding no exception to liability under
18 U.S.C. § 1001 for an "exculpatory no").
233. Q BIECKlIR, supra note 1, at 161 (noting that "whether the misbehaver shows proper deference to the
enforcer" will likely guide enforcers' selective application of rules).
234. See generally Justin Peters, The Idealist, SI.An (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
technology/20 13/02/aaronswartz-he-wantedto savethe-world.why-couldn-t-he-savehimself.html.
235. Aaron Swartz, Guerilla Open Access Maniftsto (July 2008), available at http://archive.org/stream/
GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjuly2008djvu.txt.
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house for court filings.236 Swartz sought to provide free public access to this
universe of documents, which were public records but cost eight cents per page to
access through PACER. He succeeded in downloading nearly twenty million
pages, which he then distributed to a non-profit organization devoted to increasing
access to public domain materials. 2 3 7
In prosecutors' eyes, Swartz was a vigilante.2 38 They considered Swartz's
Manifesto to be evidence of a deliberate scheme to defy the law. 2 3 9 After the
JSTOR episode, the federal government filed a thirteen-count indictment against
him and refused to agree to any plea deal that did not include jail time.240 In a press
release, Massachusetts U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz stated that "[sitealing is
stealing whether you use a computer command or a crowbar, and whether you take
documents, data or dollars." 2 4 ' But the prosecution's opportunity to define the
narrative concerning Swartz's conduct was abruptly preempted when Swartz
committed suicide while awaiting trial.2 42 Backlash against the U.S. Attorney's
office prosecuting the case was swift. Media outlets swarmed around the theme of
prosecutorial overreaching and dangerously expansive computer crime laws.24 3
Members of Congress, calling Swartz's behavior harmless, condemned the punish-
ment. 24 In a matter of days, Swartz had become a martyr.
236. Peters, supra note 234.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Ryan J. Reilly, Aaron Swartz Prosecutors Weighed 'Guerilla'Manifesto. Justice Official Tells Congressio-
nal Committee, HuFFINGTN POST (Feb. 22, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/22/aaron-
swartz-prosecutors-n_2735675.html; see also Government's Consolidated Response to Defendant's Motions to
Suppress, United States v. Swartz, Case No. I I-CR-10260 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2012).
240. See Reilly, supra note 239.
241. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Dist. of Mass., Alleged Hacker Charged with Stealing Over
Four Million Documents from MITNetwork (July 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/
201 1/July/SwartzAaronPR.html.
242. Peters, supra note 234.
243. See, e.g., David Amsden, The Brilliant Life and Tragic Death ofAaron Swartz, Ro.I.NG STONE (Feb. 28,
2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-brilliant-life-and-tragic-death-of-aaron-swartz-20130215;
Lincoln Caplan, Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial Discretion, TAKING Non-, (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://
takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/aaron-swartz-and-prosecutorial-discretion/; Scott Horton, Carmen Or-
tiz Strikes Out, HARPER's MAGAZINE (Jan. 18, 2013), http://harpers.org/blog/2013/01/carmen-ortiz-strikes-out/;
Charles P. Pierce, Carmen Ortiz's Very Bad, Awfiul Month, ESQUIRE (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/
politics/More-badNews ForCarmenOrtiz; Will Wrigley, Darrell Issa Praises Aaron Swartz, Internet Free-
dom at Memorial, HuizFINaTON PosT (Feb. 7,2013, 12:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/07/darrell-
issa-internet-freedomn_2633197.htnl; Wesley Yang, The Life and Afterlife ofAaron Swartz, Nuiw YORK MAG.
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/aaron-swartz-2013-2/.
244. See, e.g., Wrigley, supra note 243 (quoting congressman Darrell Issa's rebuke of federal prosecutors for
targetting Swartz's "harmless acts"); Matt Pearce, Aaron Swartz's Suicide Continues to Ripple Through Congress,
L.A. TiMiis (Feb. 5, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/05/nation/la-na-nn-aaron-swartz-washington-
memorial-20130205 (quoting congressman Jared Polis's description of the Swartz prosecution as "a perversity of
justice"); Brendan Sasso & Jennifer Martinez, Lawmakers Slan DOJ Prosecution of Swartz as 'Ridiculous,
Absurd', THiE Hu.L (Jan. 15, 2013, 10:52 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/277353-
lawmakers-blast-trumped-up-doj-prosecution-of-internet-activist (quoting Polis's description of the prosecution
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The Aaron Swartz prosecution was supposed to demonstrate the importance of
respect for property rights in information. Instead, its most lasting legacy may be
as a lightning rod for deepening opposition to those rights. While the events are
still too recent to draw firm conclusions, the immediate aftermath of the prosecu-
tion indicates that seeking to incarcerate Swartz for his civil disobedience has been
self-defeating.
2. Tactical Enforcement Designed to Achieve Desired Litigation Outcomes
The separation of moral entrepreneurship powers is also less significant where
an enforcer elects to focus on litigation outcomes rather than on upholding a
moral rule. Prosecutors began using pretextual charges as a tool to clear the
streets of particularly undesirable criminals around the time that organized crime
syndicates emerged in America in the mid-twentieth century.245 In the process,
prohibitions on vices became less about defining the crime and more about
punishing particular criminals. 2 4 6 When prosecutors could not convict a de-
fendant for the conduct they were actually targeting, usually violent felonies,
they filed less serious but more easily provable substitute charges. Al Capone
was famously prosecuted and convicted not for his Volstead Act violations or
the hits that he had ordered on his rivals, but for failing to pay his income
taxes.247 In 2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft praised the Justice Depart-
ment under Robert Kennedy for prosecuting mob kingpins on such obscure
offenses as lying on a federal home loan application and violating the Migratory
Bird Act.2 4 8 Today, charges for drug offenses often act as substitutes for violent
felonies.2 49
Known criminals are not the only subjects of pretextual enforcement. Tactical
arrests for small offenses also afford police an opportunity to investigate for
evidence of larger ones. In New York City, transit police are unexpectedly rigid in
their enforcement of subway rules against putting feet up on the seats, walking
between subway cars, and occupying more than one seat at a time. The reason,
they say, is that enforcing these minor prohibitions often ensnares wanted fel-
as "ridiculous and trumped-up" and congresswoman Zoe Lofgren's statements that the DOJ was "way out of line"
and the handling of the case had been "outrageous").
245. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone 's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 CoLum. L. REv. 583 (2005); David A Skeel Jr. & William Stuntz, The Criminal Law
of Gambling: A Puzzling History, in GAMBLING: MAPPING THE AMERICAN MORAL LANDSCAPE 257, 278-80
(Alan Wolfe & Erik C. Owens eds., 2009).
246. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 245, at 276.
247. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 245, at 583.
248. WILLIAM J. STuNrZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 301 (2011).
249. See id.
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ons. 250 Similarly, police enforce the traffic code as a means to perform drug
searches incident to a traffic stop, a strategy that has been blessed by the Supreme
Court.25'
A separation between creators and enforcers matters less when the enforcers
prioritize the identity of the criminal over the substance of the crime. Because
these enforcers are not endeavoring to enforce a prohibition, they are less likely to
respond to communal social norms regarding the prohibited conduct. As a result,
they are more likely to pursue enforcement strategies that undermine the moral
entrepreneurship effort.252
Less opportunity for pretextual prosecution therefore means less opportunity to
fall into the backlash trap. The absence of federal prosecutions of peer-to-peer
copyright infringers may be partly explained by the absence of other offenses
that could be caught in the enforcement net. Because most users of peer-to-peer
downloading services tend to be otherwise law-abiding, there will rarely be a
serious offense for which copyright infringement could be a pretext for prosecu-
tion. The conduct motivating punishment is the same as the conduct actually
punished. The identity between the two ensures that prosecutors remain focused on
enforcement of a moral rule. And the better they maintain that focus, the better
they internalize communal social norms.
3. Identity between Creators'and Enforcers'Normative Sensibilities
The division of rule creation and enforcement among different actors is only
meaningful to the extent that those actors' normative sensibilities differ. Recall
that in the classic mold, a rule enforcer is "not so much concerned with the content
of any particular rule as he is with the fact that it is his job to enforce the
rule."2 53 That concern translates to an interest in not only maximizing compliance
but also minimizing public hostility to enforcement.25 4 And that interest, in turn,
leads enforcers to tailor their activities to prevailing norms (in economic terms,
enforcement may be said to be norm-elastic). 25 5 So long as this idealized
characterization holds true, the enforcer provides a check on the creator's exces-
sive moral entrepreneurial ambition.
By contrast, an enforcer who shares the rule creator's zeal for eradicating the
prohibited conduct is separate in form only-not in substance. Because this
enforcer bears more social fidelity with the rule creators than with the community
250. See Joseph Goldstein & Christine Haughney, Relax., i You Want, but Don't Put Your Feet Up, N.Y. TIMEis
(Jan 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/nyregion/minor-offense-on-ny-subway-can-bring-ticket-or-
handcuffs.htmi.
251. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
252. See Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 245, at 279-80. See generally Richman & Stuntz, supra note 245.
253. BlICKER, supra note 1, at 156; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
254. See TYuiR, supra note 27, at 24-25.
255. See id.
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subject to the rule, she is wont to ignore existing norms and enforce the rule
broadly (here, enforcement may be said to be norm-inelastic).*
Such an identity between the normative sensibilities of rule creators and of rule
enforcers can occur for a variety of reasons. First, it can emerge from racial or class
differences between enforcers and the community that they police.257 Second, it
can occur when formally distinct enforcement institutions are staffed with person-
nel who are rule creators themselves. One of Becker's archetypical rule creators
was Harry Anslinger, the first commissioner of the FBN. According to Becker, he
was the primary entrepreneur behind the moral panic over marijuana that took hold
in the late 1930s. He also happened to be the head of the agency that enforced
federal drug prohibitions. 258 As the FBN was predisposed to consider marijuana a
moral vice, it continued to escalate penalties against marijuana use even as the
drug became normatively acceptable among white middle-class youth.259 That
harsh enforcement led to dissent against the prohibition and rallied the movement
for decriminalization.260
Third, clustering specialists together may produce an echo chamber that re-
inforces support for the rule creators' cause. The professional dynamic of special-
ized units often pushes members toward a strict norm that justifies the unit's
existence, even if a more permissive norm enjoys popular support.26 ' This echo
chamber effect presents a dilemma for moral entrepreneurs. On the one hand,
driving a wedge between society's norms and enforcers' norms lowers the
safeguard against backlash that separation of moral entrepreneurship powers
generally provides. On the other hand, the institutional design responsible for that
wedge also raises the enforcers' level of expertise. Therefore, specialization would
be costly to discard.262
Although prosecutors of copyright infringement have not expanded the universe
256. The notion of "social fidelity" comes from Mark A. Edwards, Law and the Parameters of Acceptable
Deviance, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLxiY 49, 73-74 (2006).
257. See STUNTZ, supra note 248, at 29-32 (discussing the effect of communal self-rule on the administration
of criminal justice).
258. See BECKER, supra note 1, at 135-46; JEROmi L. HIMMta.sTtIN, THE STRANGEI CAREER 01 MARIHUANA
25-30 (1983) (listing followers of Becker's theory).
259. See HIMMiatSTEIN, supra note 258, at 100-03.
260. See id. at 103-05.
261. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 37, at 629-30 (describing the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms as an example of how grouping specialists exclusively with one another causes their "collective
propensity to enforce [to] feed on itself through the mechanisms of social influence").
262. See Vermeule, supra note 132, at 411. A full consideration of how to retain specialists' expertise while
insulating them from self-defeating enforcement policy is outside the scope of this Article. But one potential
arrangement worth further consideration is allowing specialized units to perform their traditional investigatory
and advocacy functions while assigning generalist prosecutors the charging decision. C: Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing ( Prosecutors: Lessons froin Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. Ri'v. 869
(2009) (proposing separation of investigatory and adjudicative functions within the prosecutor's office). This
would let enforcers continue to reap the benefits of the specialists' subject matter expertise while entrusting
enforcement policy to those with norms closer to the societal mean.
2014] 399
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
of defendants beyond core violators, the echo chamber dilemma is one that
copyright crusaders ought to take seriously going forward. Institutions dedicated
to reducing intellectual property infringement have recently begun to proliferate
within the federal government, including the Office of the U.S. Intellectual
Property Enforcement Coordinator (better known as the "IP Czar") within the
White House,2 63 the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center
within U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 26 the Task Force on Intellec-
tual Property within the DOJ, 2 6 5 and over two dozen Computer Hacking and
Intellectual Property units within U.S. Attorneys' Offices nationwide.266 As public
enforcement of copyright law becomes more specialized, the moral entrepreneur-
ship benefit of that public enforcement becomes more fragile.267
CONCLUSION
Moral entrepreneurs can learn much from the American political ideal of
separation of powers. This is because moral entrepreneurship at its best relies
on the exercise of independent judgment by different institutional actors. When
creators over-create, it is up to the enforcers to rein in. Expansive entrepreneurship
in the law on the books thus finds a healthy complement in narrow entrepreneur-
ship in the law on the ground.
From 2003 to 2008, the RIAA chose to play its own enforcer. That attempt to
strong-arm social norms may have rallied more support around the opposition than
existed to begin with. The federal government, by contrast, has avoided this fate.
Through exercising selectivity and exclusively targeting suspects alien to the
average file-sharer's daily life, it has been able to define a boundary between
deviance and normalcy. While that boundary remains less exclusive than some
rightsholders would prefer, the selective approach has proven more effective.
This history is evidence that those reasonably divorced from the passions of a
moral crusade are better equipped to focus on the easy targets. And though those
targets may not be the ones that rule creators are most bent on marginalizing, they
are still the ones that society is most willing to accept as marginal. The dispassion-
263. See 15 U.S.C.§ 8111 (2012).
264. See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, New National Intellectual Property Rights
Coordination Center Opens in Virginia (Jul. 10, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0807/
0807 10washington.htm.
265. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces New Intellectual Property Task Force
as Part of Broad IP Enforcement Initiative (Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
February/10-ag- I 37.html.
266. Offices of the United States Attorneys, Districts with Specialized CHIP Units, U.S. DiEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefingroom/cc/graphics.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
267. See Yochai Benkler, Seven Lessons from SOPA/PIPA/Megaupload and Four Proposals on Where We Go
From Here, TECHPRESIDENT (Jan. 25, 2012), http://techpresident.comInews/21680/seven-lessons-sopapipamega
uplaod-and-four-proposals-where-we-go-here (noting that the "professional success" of specialized units respon-
sible for prosecuting copyright infringement is "measured by (a) how threatening we think Piracy is, and (b) how
many large prosecutions they are able to bring").
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ate enforcer can maintain moral capital by picking on the weak, the individuals
whose behavior already prepackages them for stigmatization. The easy cases may
be something of a straw man, but the clever enforcer recognizes that straw men can
put up much less of a fight than real ones. It is through such "gestures of
indignation," as sociologist Albert Cohen once remarked, that "one aligns oneself
symbolically with the angels without having to take up cudgels against the
devil."268
268. Albert K. Cohen, The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior, in Sociourmy TODAY 461,
465 n.4 (Robert K. Merton et al. eds., 1959).
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